The REVIEW
of RELIGION

VOLUME I JANUARY, 1937 NUMBER 2

THE SPIRIT AND THE LIFE: A DIALOGUE*

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Simmias and Cebes find that their earlier questions about a future existence are answered empirically in the fact of their present incarnation as teachers of theology in 1936. They often wonder whether the other problems which interested them will receive a similar empirical solution. Cebes especially is troubled by the fact that the world is turning to empiricism since he does not see how theology can express its issues in that way. He often complains to Simmias that the age of theology in the proper sense of the word has passed, since the present generation is interested only in the testimony of the senses. At the same time, he believes that the attempts of some theorists to claim the support of the scientific method is ridiculous. Jung may pretend, for example, that from the presence of a horse in a dream he can infer its cause. But Cebes holds that while he may see a horse, horseness he does not see, and that when he misses the invisible he misses the theologically important. Simmias, on the other hand, is an emancipated spirit, and gives science the credit for it. He is inclined to believe that the solution of the problems of church and state will be found with the use of the scientific method. The world is one, and knowledge of it is of one sort, i.e., the kind obtained through science. Cebes is more doubtful. The existence of church and state suggests to him that the world is incompletely unified, and that practical as well as theoretical problems require the discovery of a method compatible with metaphysical dualism. He begins with a flat statement of his thesis.

Let us start, said Cebes, with the datum which science and theology agree is original, that is, with human behavior. And let us recall at the outset the familiar distinction between the lure of persuasion on the one hand and the force of compulsion on the other, the

* Presidential address read at the meeting of the American Theological Society (Eastern Branch), April 17, 1936.

distinction between the reasons and the causes of our ideas. Here we have, as it seems to me, a clear case of a well-known dualism which the scientific method attempts to deny. That would make me suspicious, at the outset, of the attempt to apply the scientific method to religion and theology. Science is an intellectual device developed in Europe in the nineteenth century. It comes, that is to say, in a period noted more for its practical interest than for its religious insights. Yet we are told today that it must be used in all its provincialism to solve problems that are universal. I doubt if the best scientists themselves meant the process of "reduction" to go so far. Take this question of church and state which we are to discuss. Shall we deal with it through religion or science? When war comes shall I act from reason or necessity, that is, shall I do the will of God or of Congress?

Of course, said Simmias, that is a false antithesis, and one which the introduction of the scientific method would correct. There is no clear contrast between God and government, between the ideal and the real. As James showed, the ideal and the real must be dynamically continuous, otherwise we lose ourselves in fantasy. Now with your love for words and for general ideas, you would, I suppose, call yourself a pacifist. But if you do, you merely assume a tag which isn't even a price-mark, because it doesn't tell what your value is. Should a pacifist support the League of Nations if it decides for sanctions? That is a pertinent question because it is specific. The answer will depend on science, because it will take all the facts into account and form them into a tenable hypothesis.

No, said Cebes, I repeat that the problem of how the ideal has operated on the real, and how it can be made to operate more effectively, is one which cannot be answered by standardizing our methods and our data as science does. That is what makes me apprehensive about present day tendencies to resolve values into facts on the one hand, and on the other to make God into a God of wrath and majesty. You see the first tendency in Professor Macintosh's attempt to make theology into an empirical science by construing God as existent after the manner of a scientific datum, and also in Professor Wieman's emphasis on the process of integration.[1] To make these ideas tenable,

[1] D. C. Macintosh, *Theology as an Empirical Science;* H. N. Wieman, *Religious Experience and Scientific Method.*

Professor Macintosh has to introduce a form of appreciation which is measured by sensuous standards, though not itself sensuous, while Professor Wieman is led to a thorough-going sensationalism in his religious epistemology. Yet how can God be both an object of sense-experience and, as Professor Wieman himself says, the widest and fullest environment, past and future?[2] The other emphasis, which makes God's power paramount, comes out in Professor Van Dusen's definition of God as the most "living, pregnant, potent of Beings—an ever present, ever active, all-encompassing Reality" toward which our attitude should be that of "one who bows awestruck, helpless, penitent, wondering before the Divine Majesty." "We moderns," says Professor Van Dusen, "are in the habit of defining what God *should* be, that is, what we insist that he shall be if we are to grant him worship. . . . Rather we must *acknowledge* God . . . behind the majesty and grandeur of Nature."[3] Professor John Bennett, in a published address, says man is "a creature dependent at every moment of his existence upon God." And Professor Richard Niebuhr is emphatic that theology must be as disinterested as other sciences and must inquire into the actual workings of God irrespective of human wishes or ideals.

Surely this is reasonable enough, said Simmias. If you want to know God you must be disinterested in your inquiry. And if God isn't an object of knowledge then what and where is he? As for dependence—it was all-important even for such a theologian as Schleiermacher.

Yes, said Cebes, but Schleiermacher meant the dependence of a spiritual kinship, not that of physical being. I agree that the use of the scientific method is an attempt to bring knowledge into religion and unity into our total *Weltanschauung*. But I distrust the comparison of knowledge of God with that of knowledge of a physical object, and the unity in the offiing is that of either pantheism or naturalism with the odds strongly in favor of the latter. This Kierkegaardian-Barthian influence, for example, with its apocalyptic suggestiveness seems at first to give us a way of rising out of time into the eternal. But apocalypticism today is bound to take on the naturalistic coloring which Marx has given it. We know that we live in a dependable world

[2] H. N. Wieman, *The Wrestle of Religion with Truth*, p. 140.
[3] H. P. Van Dusen, *God in These Times*, p. 72.

and we are compelled to interpret the apocalyptic changes which everyone feels to be in the air today as the product of inevitable forces at work in society. If we are to regain our belief in God it seems to me that we must sharpen our sense for the difference between God's will and what we call natural law. God is a God not of fact but of value, not of nature but of spirit, not of life but of the good life,—to put it most sharply, not of lust but of love.

You would deny then that God is Creator? asked Simmias.

I would rather have you remember the kinds of creation which are possible, Cebes replied. Creation may mean the pronouncement of a fiat, or the gradual achievement of a moral purpose. To say "Let there be light" is not the same as to form man as a living soul. We shall get further religiously by thinking of man as a living soul, and not as electricity disguised. And this suggests again the difference between the scientific and the religious datum. I sometimes wonder about Professor Whitehead's statement that potentiality must exist "definitely and somewhere." Does this apply to God? Does it apply to the interests of our theologians? They don't seem to me to have a "definite and somewhere" look about them. And for my part I'm glad they don't. It may be time to stress not the dependability but the elusiveness of God. After all, if knowledge of God were like knowledge of a fact, then the man who could demonstrate the existence of God would be a religious man. Heaven forbid that we should admit this identity!

Your dualism, like all metaphysical dualisms, means simply an inability to think your problem through, said Simmias. If this is all you can contribute you may as well give up. No one should be afraid to look facts in the face. The truth is that you have not only killed the goose, but smashed the golden egg. All the king's theologians can't put it together again.

I admit, said Cebes, the metaphysical demand for unity, and the obligation of philosophy to reach a single world-formula, but I feel that this is a time for stressing the religious demand for contrast, and the fact that religion comes to bring not peace but a sword. Surely you will agree that the monism of naturalism is a reductio *ad libitum*, which in this case means *ad libidinem*. Reducing is all right at times, just as a depression may have its uses, but in its way it is as bad as the inflation of idealism.

But you don't need to be a naturalist if you are an empiricist, said

Simmias. Look at James. For him the experience of form or relation is one with the experience of the sense-datum.

Yes, said Cebes, but the great question must always be whether, where value is concerned, James really did get his experience of form out of the same flux which gave him the sensations. Let me illustrate the difference between existence and quality, and our attitudes toward them, by asking you if there is scientific proof for the existence of God.

I have not found one, said Simmias.

Exactly, said Cebes, and I affirm that the question of God is, at least in its preliminary stages, not only non-scientific but non-intellectualistic as well. The question is not of the is-ness or existence of God or of our knowledge of his existence. We have hardly begun to be able to formulate the question in those terms at all, and this means that we should not put our problem in the form—"Is there a God?" But if we ask "Does our world contain God-like things?" we get an immediate response. This suggests to me that the experience of God lies in the realm of quality and that the problem begins there, wherever else it may lead. Even Barth means this with his talk of "*existentielles Denken*" and the need for participating in the practical tasks of life. Notice, please, that we do not react to these Godlike qualities as we do to existent things. An animals bumps up against an existing thing and uses it to satisfy its own instinctive drives. But the response to the God-like quality, to the essence if you prefer the term, is possible only for the disciplined mind and heart. Now if I were interested in showing the unity between science and religion, instead of, as at present, their difference, I would begin by saying that science and philosophy, like religion are based on emotion since they originate in the wish to inquire.

In spite of yourself then, said Simmias, you would arrive at an empirical unity, since you would trace both back to the existence of a desire.

No, said Cebes, for this unity is a very unstable thing. It breaks up into parts as soon as you see it for what it is. In the first place, the desire for truth isn't sheer uncultivated desire. It is a trained interest which most people don't have at all. It is something imposed on ordinary life by reflection on the demands of consistency. So the philosophy of religion is based not on what we have as living beings—this, I think, is the mistake of the pragmatists, and also of those who turn to

primitive man for a definition. It is based rather on what we have only after we have struggled to have it. Both philosophy and religion bring satisfaction, but not the sort which the common man understands; they bring security, but one which is compatible with every experienced danger, and salvation which offers no relief from struggle.[4] So while your empiricists would emphasize a God of being and power who exists in Nature, and your rationalists would emphasize a God of thought who exists in mind, I would point to a God whose relation to existence is still a philosophical problem, but whose power is felt in the lure of that which may be made to exist. Religion is the attraction of the absolute value which is as yet unrealized. An evidence of this force is your own response to it in your own attempt to avoid it. You feel it, that is, in your attempt to be consistent.

Are you then a Kantian? asked Simmias.

Call me rather a Platonist, Cebes replied. Kant's *a priori* is something used in experiencing. Plato's forms, which are to me the God-like things, are actually experienced, even if we have to say that the original experience occurs in another life.

Do you accept the Platonic dualism? Simmias asked.

I suppose that all metaphysical dualisms go back ultimately to the Platonic type, said Cebes. That is, the question of the status of mathematical forms, logical essences, valid rules, standards of value, and potentiality, is a question which must occupy our minds as it did Plato's and which cannot be merely denied as it was by Aristotle. The recent history of the problem does date from Kant. But Kant gave us absolutes which weren't real and reality which was only sensuous. The practical reason is primary for ethics but useless for metaphysics. Sense-experience is necessary for knowledge, but the knowledge is of that which the mind constructs. Hegel overcomes Kant's dualism but at the expense of giving a more satisfactory account of mind than of nature.

Yet this doesn't prove that a monism is impossible, said Simmias. Take that of Professor Whitehead. He protests against the bifurcation of nature and the denial of the existence of possibilities. All these latter, he says, must be actively entertained by the Eros. You will recall also his solution of the mind-body problem by comparing the unorganized mass of emotional life to the stream of electrical energy,

[4] C. A. Bennett, *The Dilemma of Religious Knowledge.*

and his continued insistence on the unity in the occasion, a unity of concretion, of subjective form, and of self-enjoyment. It is absurd, Professor Whitehead thinks, to imagine that possibilities are somewhere in cold storage, waiting for the world to bump into them.

I am acquainted, replied Cebes, with Professor Whitehead's protest against the bifurcation of nature, but it seems to me that he has not kept his own skirts clear of bifurcation. He has certainly bifurcated God. And he has bifurcated reason into that which Plato shares with the gods and that which Ulysses shares with the foxes. Then what of these flashes of illumination which for Professor Whitehead suddenly appear and direct the emotional advance? Are they of a piece with the advance itself? They seem to appear where they might not have appeared, for they direct the stream into one channel rather than another. What of this "aim" by which novelty is achieved? In Professor Whitehead's own words it involves "the operation of something purely ideal which controls and directs the process." This along with the stress on conceptual attainment and on final causes seems to me to raise a problem which is not dismissed by calling it merely creativity doing its stuff. I think one may also claim that in his view of the primordial nature of God as the limitation upon creativity by virtue of which types of order are achieved, Professor Whitehead has introduced the goodness of God to limit the irrationality of Nature. But he achieves rationality by discontinuity.

Why can't you say that his unity is simply a unity of experience, like that of Professor Dewey? asked Simmias.

Simply, said Cebes, because Professor Dewey also appeals from the mass of experience to an integrating or as I would say critical factor. That is what creative intelligence means. Creative intelligence aims toward what should be. Now you may say all you like about the fact that this judgment of what should be is drawn from experience and will return to experience and must be tested by experience. This is all true and beside the point. The point is that Professor Dewey makes a judgment on the basis of what has not come to him out of the empirical flux. One way of putting it is to say that he invokes logic to supplement psychology. This he does in forthright fashion when he says explicitly that we must estimate as well as esteem, appraise as well as prize, find not the satisfying but the rightly satisfactory.[5] The ex-

[5] John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty*, p. 260.

perience of value must rest on a judgment of value. And in *A Common Faith* Dewey expresses loyalty sometimes to the ideal, sometimes to the sheer totality of Nature itself.

You seem to me, said Simmias, to be criticizing Professor Dewey because he becomes religious at times in spite of himself. It may be difficult for a philosopher with naturalistic interests to avoid a certain dualism when he treats the religious theme, but surely the case is different with philosophers who are professedly religious. They work under the spell of the divine unity.

Yes, said Cebes, but when they are idealists they seem to me to apply the word "mind" to that which may be related to but is not itself mind, and when they are realists or empiricists they have difficulty in showing how mind works. Dualism, open or unavowed, lurks behind their words. Take some of the members of our own society. Professor Pratt has come out valiantly for a dualism of process.[6] When he deals with matter he says "never mind" and when he investigates mind he says "no matter." Professor Lyman gives us an experience which includes both science and faith, both reason and intuition, both a creative will in nature and a mystical experience in which we apprehend the purposes of that will.[7]

I see no contradiction here, said Simmias.

Nor do I, said Cebes, and that is my point. But I do see a difference between the two features of experience and a need for explaining why the ideal of the synthetic or creative intuition is so different from the ends which the creative will actually attains in nature. I believe that the two exist side by side and I am merely protesting against a unity which is too facile. Now take Professor Macintosh's case. He construes the problem of religious knowledge in terms of scientific knowledge, and solves the epistemological problem by invoking the parallel of sense-experience. But when analyzed the experience turns out to be one where the new element is not knowledge but will, so that religion becomes an experience of value rather than fact. The hands are intellectualistic but the voice is that of pragmatism. Once again, notice the dualism which Professors Knudson and Brightman are fighting. Professor Knudson writes: "The only solution is a monism that transcends the dualism of thoughts and things without destroying it . . . that traces the origin

[6] J. B. Pratt, *Matter and Spirit.*
[7] E. W. Lyman, *The Meaning and Truth of Religion.*

both of finite minds and the world of things to a common underlying intelligence."[8] That seems to me characteristic of personalism. It is both one and many, both idealistic and realistic, both logical and empirical, both free and determined.

Why shouldn't it be? asked Simmias.

It should, replied Cebes, but it shouldn't call the result monism. Again, what of the epistemological dualism which the personalists stress so much in the human sphere? Doesn't it apply to God as a Self, and if so isn't there much outside his control beside human personal selves? Professor Brightman puts the dualism inside God as a conflict between his will and the "given." I think this is but another instance of the fact that interest in the synoptic method may blind us to the uses which the analytic method has.

I hope you notice, said Simmias, that you are playing into the hands of the personalists at this point. The two members of the dichotomy can be brought together only in personal experience, so reality is personal after all.

No, said Cebes, I would agree that the two unite in personal life, but I would not agree that personal life is the only type of existence. Indeed I have often wondered at the emphasis the personalists put on personality as both the most important thing that can exist and the only thing that does exist. It seems like an extreme attenuation of the most significant thing in the world and a neutralizing of its qualities. I should say that the personalists ought to admit their dualism or else, as Professor Pratt once remarked, they may find themselves sliding down the inclined plane with the Absolute at the bottom waiting to engulf them. The dilemma crops up in so much of our modern religious thought. Those who appeal to teleology are but making the problem of evil more acute. To invoke "humanism" means for one school an appeal to the transcendent moral law, for the other an immersion in the empirical flux. A growing movement would call on a mysterious God of wrath, yet would not wait for him to act but would wreak his vengeance by participating in the class struggle. The most truly humane synthesis appears to me to be found in mysticism with its dialectical process, in which are combined contemplation and action, the isolation and transiency of the experience of the divine with an aggressive social will. It brings an experience of form, yet

[8] A. C. Knudson, *The Philosophy of Personalism*, p. 110.

does not rest until content is achieved. It appeals to emotion and the instinctive drives underlying emotion. In this sense it is empirical. Yet it invokes also a mood in which these drives are criticized. It takes a synthetic view by dealing with life in its widest context, as it is lived from day to day, and so perhaps gives us a glimpse of the progressive type of unity which is the only type possible. But I think that much remains to be done on the topic of mysticism.

You would say, then, that such unity as we can attain is practical and not philosophical? asked Simmias.

I would say at least that philosophically we don't seem to have gone very far, Cebes replied. The problem for our thought is after all the one which was bequeathed by Royce and James. James began with human desires and was willing to let them work themselves out on a strictly competitive plane. Any desire has a right to be satisfied, he said. If not, prove why not. Then, in the light of his biological figure of organism and environment he argued that consistency or form was simply a means of controlling desire which was worked out under the stress of the struggle for survival. But when he turned to religion the biological figure broke down, and with it pragmatism went by the board. The desires of religion are not for survival, as the martyr knows, and the world of spiritual values does not require the type of adjustment which is needed in the world of empirical fact. James didn't choose his own values for their survival quality, and he was willing to put them to the test of survival merely because his confidence was based on the sureness of his own spiritual insight.

Yes, said Simmias, but James was admittedly a pluralist after all. Royce offered the world something different.

But look at Royce's history, said Cebes. He began with will. His early essays show a straight voluntarism. Then he switched to idea. Then he felt that he had moved too far away from experienced facts, so he came back to will under the control of idea, and treated the will as at least incipiently the will to know which operates in the formal structure that consistency provides.

But what about the will which doesn't want to know? asked Simmias. You will remember Santayana's remark that Royce thought it was really right that things should be wrong, but really wrong not to strive to right them.[9]

[9] G. Santayana, *Character and Opinion in the United States*, p. 126.

Yes, said Cebes, that expresses our whole problem. Why is it really wrong not to right some things that are wrong? I would say Royce came nearest to a solution when he directed our gaze toward the will not as an empirical phenomenon, but as working within an absolutistic, that is, a normative framework. That was his way of stating Plato's problem of the influence of form on content. Now my feeling is that we are balked by this problem because we don't make sufficiently vivid to ourselves the ways in which abstract form is actually at work on content here and now and every day in human life. Let me call on the most common instance of all, the influence of time.

Time is the great leveler, said Simmias, you won't get much support for values there.

On the contrary, said Cebes, the passage of time may be very productive. You will remember how time haunted the imagination of the Elizabethans—Shakespeare and Spenser, and Donne, down as far as Marvell. Today we have it in Proust and Mann and Joyce and Wolfe, yes, and in Gertrude Stein, of whom it may be said that repetition is not repetition, is not repetition! Our modern composers also are making use of horizontal musical units which work themselves out in parallel lines through the course of time to satisfactory harmonic effects.

They aren't satisfactory to me, said Simmias.

That's because you haven't allowed time to do its work, said Cebes. Notice the pictorial arts also. Picasso's rhythms it takes time to trace. But in religion we have the best instance of the influence of time upon our moods. Schleiermacher says that our best religious moments come in the presence of birth and death when we meditate on the fact of passage.[10] Windelband is most religious when he ponders on the drops of time which go out into the past.[11] Professor Whitehead says that process and reality are expressed in the verse "Abide with me, fast falls the eventide."[12] Heidegger finds man becoming religious as he discovers the structure of time.[13] And these men are but repeating what the history of religions has always known. In Greece it was not the spatialized Olympian religion but the temporally oriented Orphic rites which actually induced in men the desire for a better life. In Egypt, as Breasted has shown, it was from the worship of the sun,

[10] F. Schleiermacher, *On Religion* (Eng. tr.), p. 131.
[11] W. Windelband, *Präludien*, p. 451.
[12] A. N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, p. 318.
[13] M. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*.

with its background of rhythmic clocklike regularity that the moral sense developed. In India significance is found in the constant repetition of phrases, through question and answer, until illumination finally dawns upon the speaker and reader. In China age, which has passed through time, receives the adulation which is given by us to youth. The Arab finds his ultimate authority not in the discoveries of the laboratory but in the proverb which crystallizes the wisdom of generations. And notice, please, that pre-Islamic Arabic poetry makes time the ruler and disposer of all things, while Islamic poetry refers all things to the sovereign will of God. I doubt if the connection between the two is accidental. There is something about the juxtaposition of the human mind with the fact of time which produces a sense for value. The Jews were the most gifted people religiously whom we know, and they were more interested than any others in their origin and their destiny as a people. I am inclined to believe that Plato was working at the same idea when he set us to conversing at such length, taking more time for our arguments than seemed necessary. I often wonder if one may not argue also that the time which covered the period from his early dialogues to the later ones may have been meant by him to represent a factor which enters into our insight that the forms are here as part of our being and not aloof in a world of their own. Time helps us to solve our most pressing problem.

Are you going to bring space into the argument also, asked Simmias, and would you identify space with God as Professor Boodin[14] has done in his last two books?

No, said Cebes, space, I am convinced, has only a naturalistic significance. Whether it be a form of the mind's activity or a piece of the world, it means merely the side-by-sideness of things. Perhaps these new theories will identify it with electrical energy, but even so its energy will be different from that which religion knows. God as the ideal may exercise his lure through time, but space seems foreign to his nature. Let me take now another form as abstract as time. Consider the religious influence of mystery.

Mystery means simply the unknown, said Simmias. It seems to me to be something which should be eliminated, not cultivated.

Yet the remarkable thing is that its progressive elimination in

[14] J. E. Boodin, *Three Interpretations of the Universe; God.*

religious experience has formed the background for the production of value, said Cebes. Mystery, I admit, means literally nothing that you can talk about. Yet it leads, in the experience of the religious genius, to that which is not other than, but greater in value than present human attainment. The sacred changes from the unique and the unclassifiable to the common human value which is within the grasp of all. Says the Buddha: Not he with the platted hair or the special garb, but he who masters himself is the one I call the Brahmin.[15] Says the Hebrew prophet: Not in the mysteries of tabu nor in the seizures of insanity, but in aspiration after the common good is God to be found. To the Italians of today as truly as to the ancient Hebrews the prophet of God can say: Are ye not as the children of the Ethiopians unto me?[16] The will of God is justice, and justice knows no favorites. Now if the ancient seers worked away from sudden dream and prophetic ecstasies to the idea of the universal human value, so do we, I think, find the experience of God, not in the violent transformation into a brazen wall or an iron pillar, but in the idea which as intelligible and universal controls and brings form to our instinctive life. You may recall the comment of Dr. Carrel, in his recent book, on the incommensurability of ideas, in terms of physical energy, with the slightest muscular motion.[17] Their physical energy is infinitesimal, but their power is illimitable. This gives us a suggestion of the power which form may wield when it appears as from above. Perhaps this is what the idealist, like Royce or Bosanquet, is driving at when he talks of the influence of form. But I am not so sure as is the idealist about either the form or the values in the world of physical nature. I am unwilling to make God responsible for what goes on there. I think I do see a *nisus* in nature but accompanying it is so powerful a drag that it seems useless to go to nature for examples of God's activity. Mind, says Santayana, is a value which accrues to the body when it has reached a certain stage of perfection. Why may not God be a value of a similar type? God enters into the human situation, is known through it, is at work in it, is limited without it. God is an element clearly discernible in human experience and much less clearly discernible elsewhere. This makes me feel that

[15] Dhammapada, S B E, vol. 10, ch. 26.
[16] Amos 9:7.
[17] A. Carrel, *Man the Unknown*, ch. 3.

religion has a dualism on its hands which metaphysics has not so successfully overcome. You will recall Matthew Arnold:

> Know, man hath all that nature hath and more
> And in that more lie all his hopes of good.

Bradley, you remember, says that in the whole realm of human value there is nothing which has not come down from another world. I like also C. S. Peirce's remark that to him nothing seems so real as general notions, and that Justice and Truth are literally the most powerful things in the world. As the Chinese poet says:

> First you see the hills in the painting
> Then you see the painting in the hills.

First an abstraction, then the influence of the abstraction on your view of nature. Death to the flesh and life to the spirit before you can see any connection between spirit and flesh. Royce had this in mind, I think, when he talked of our metaphysical thirst for an absolute interpretation of the universe, akin to our ethical search for absolute standards, and our constant empirical struggle for a success which cannot be defined in empirical terms.

I was afraid, said Simmias, that you would come around to this futile talk about absolute values. For my part, I am sick of hearing about these absolutes which turn out not to be so absolute after all. At best they are a distraction, at worst a delusion. The effective man refuses to spend his time mooning over absolutes which are the refuge of the introvert, and lets himself go in loyalty to the world which gives him a chance to paint a picture or write a novel or preach the gospel or even enjoy a good dinner. I can but applaud the remark of Justice Holmes[18] that life is an end in itself, the question whether it is worth living being only the question whether you can get enough of it. Ever since Descartes[19] we have suffered from the idea of points and lines which exist not as we see them but as we don't see them, and of a state which exists as an ideal and not as a functioning government. Men have viewed themselves not as human beings but as living mathematical monstrosities with inalienable rights and static absolute values. But, as Ortega says, it is illogical to guillotine a prince and

[18] Quoted by R. B. Perry, *The Thought and Character of William James*, 2:250.
[19] Ortega y Gasset, *The Modern Theme*, p. 35.

replace him with a principle. The one is as despotic as the other. A little realism would show us that ideas come out of the stream of life, thought is a vital function like digestion, truth must never be dissociated from the organic process in which it was achieved. The good must be not merely correct, but also appealing. Because we have not seen this, our culture has become flat, lifeless, byzantified. This accounts for our craze for the absurdities of Picasso and Schönberg. Instead of loving the good or God we love the love of the good or of God. I'm for a return to actuality, which means history and science.

I can only admit much of what you say, replied Cebes, but I find it necessary to be discriminating with regard to some of the points you raise. I would agree, for example, that justice begins in history with much the same function as food. But as history proceeds justice acquires a status of its own. The appeal to origins like the appeal to consequences is a result of the pragmatic fallacy of isolation. Take sexual love as an illustration.[20] Originating in the animal need of getting another generation born it has developed certain imperious spiritual ideals, so that one chief reason why another generation should be born is that love may go on. The same is true of the intellect. Originating in the service of life it has developed the function of understanding absolute truth. So that now life seems to find in the attainment of truth one of its own highest functions. Much the same is true of religion. So many writers say that it arose in the impulse to self-preservation. But soon they explain that self-preservation actually means self-realization. And this means in turn that a man must often die that his tribe may live. That is an interesting development of the idea of self-preservation, and implies that a new and critical element has entered. What interests me chiefly is the appearance of this critical element and the demand it makes.

Ultimately it is the demand of society, observed Simmias.

In the last analysis I doubt that, Cebes replied. The idea of the good a man gets not from himself and his own conduct, nor yet from society, which requires conformity. It comes rather from a transcendent realm since the Good always implies effort over and above present attainment. And this brings me back to my fundamental point. The good is, if not above essence, at least above existence in

[20] William James, *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 351.

dignity and power. "In every art, in every science, there is the keen perception of certain relations being right," says James.[21] We experience this rightness at times—then we are religious. We fail to experience it at other times—then we may be either irreligious, or simply non-religious, that is, we may be living on the animal or vegetable plane as we naturally and legitimately do much of the time. But this is what makes me feel that a theory of reality, at least of the reality which is human, should perhaps be a dialectic if it is to represent the ebb and flow of human experience. His dialectical method may be the reason why so unintelligible a philosopher as Hegel has kept his grip on the western mind. Hegel has caught Simmel's point that life consists in being something more than life.

James has laid that specter of dialectic or rhythm, said Simmias. His suggestions of rhythm in nature are railroads and horse-cars, cradles and rocking-chairs, intermittent fevers, going up and down stairs, fires going out and being lighted, also the Italian woman who came to this country to get funds with which to return to Italy. All things are rhythms, he said, except those that are not rhythms.[22]

I don't suggest that rhythm always means advance, said Cebes, although the Italian woman may have returned richer than when she came. But I would say that religious rhythm is progressive. I suppose it is the rhythm in German life and its tendency to work things out in terms of opposites which makes possible both the brilliance of its success and the horror of its failure. In Germany it is always *Geist* against *Leben* or *Metaphysik* as opposed to *Geschichte*, Bach on one side and Brahms on the other. But when the two are found on the same program what a result! The problem of Geist and Leben comes home to me in my teaching as I see each new entering class. Sometimes I feel that theology deals only with abstract problems and has lost the living touch. But then when I observe the eagerness of the best men in each class for the formal play of philosophical speculation, I see that life has a tendency to take on form, and that form is renewed and justified by being brought into touch with life. That was Wagner's problem in *Die Meistersinger* where the romantic urge of Walter's melody bursts the bonds of the mastersinger's idea of classical form and then disciplines itself to take

[21] William James, *Principles of Psychology*, 2:471.
[22] R. B. Perry, op. cit. 1:483.

account of the rightness of the form claim. The result sets all the world a-singing. You have a similar development in the progress of this new movement called *Phänomenologie.* First Husserl appears with his abstract essences,[23] then Scheler with his appreciation of essence and form yet his love of the concrete.[24] Husserl fails to get back to earth; Scheler sets up a dualism of form and content. Then Heidegger asks whether the dualism is not itself artificial.[25] The problem of Sein is too formal, that of Wert too immediate. You must deal rather with the problem of *Existenz,* in which being, meaning, and value are all bound together, or *Resonanz,* as Heinemann[26] would call it. Now *Existenz,* you remember, is Kierkegaard's word, and is used by him to express the desperateness of the religious situation. So we have in Heidegger a metaphysical unity where truth is not a harmony of subject and object as separate things, but *a-lethia,* taking the concealment away, revealing the immediate contact already there. Yet we have also religious diversity, since man feels the desperate urgency of the religious situation and strives to free himself from flesh and live unto the spirit.

It still sounds to me like a violation of simple logical principles, said Simmias. Either your world is one, or it is two. If it is two it is not a world, and if it is one we'd better develop a method, like that of science for dealing with it. Any dualism is bound to work out into contradictions. Plato is a dualist,[27] and on his pages contradictions run riot. He talks of virtue as that which all men must seek, but when they have it, it is by an act of grace. Geometry can be taught because it is not debatable. Virtue cannot be taught because it is. The idea of the Good is all-important but there is no definition of the Good. It is the principle of existence and therefore utilitarian, and yet it is an end in itself. The Dialogues give us the insight of the talking man, yet the end is *theoria,* the experience of the contemplative man. We should seek absolute values, yet the good life is a harmony of various elements in accordance with the mean, i.e., not too much pleasure compared with wisdom and not too much wisdom to rule out pleasure. He gives us intrinsic worths yet in his politics

[23] E. Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie.*
[24] M. Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Wertethik.*
[25] M. Heidegger, *op. cit.*
[26] F. Heinemann, *Neue Wege der Philosophie.*
[27] Cf. Kelsen, "Die Platonische Gerichtigkeit." *Kant Studien,* vol. 38.

the end justifies such means as deception. He is a monotheist, yet quotes with approval the popular beliefs in many gods; he believes in romantic love, yet countenances homosexuality. He excludes poets, yet is himself a great poet. He ascribes true being only to universals, yet in the Phaedo allows immortality to individuals, and again in the Symposium suggests that there is immortality only of fame and influence. In the Meno he is confident only of the spirit of doubt. The Good in the Philebus is all-inclusive, while in the earlier dialogues it is a principle of selection. All this seems to me to show the contradictions which beset your path once you have admitted, as Plato does at the start, the dualism of world of form and world of experience.

Yes, my friend, said Cebes, but don't you see the clue which Plato provided?

No, said Simmias, I must confess that I don't.

It is plain, said Cebes, in the fact that these two worlds move nearer together as the dialogues proceed and as the argument progresses from the earlier to the later. And it is there, clearly, in the figure of Socrates.

What do you mean? asked Simmias.

I mean simply that Plato suggests that these are the elements which enter into the life of a good man.[28] It is true that he doesn't define the good, but he does show how a good man behaves, and for a pragmatist like yourself I should think that would be enough. In the Phaedo he doesn't so much advance arguments for immortality as show how a brave man meets death. In the Symposium he illustrates the good life by showing a good man eating and drinking with the others and maintaining his own poise amid distracting circumstances.

That may be good ethics, said Simmias, but it isn't a theory of reality.

Well, said Cebes, you remember that metaphysics comes after physics. A metaphysician is then the man who comes after a physician. Reality is in motion. In this motion occur evils and remedies, risings and fallings. The metaphysician watches the wound which the surgeon makes and the subsequent healing and tries to describe all, sickness

[28] F. J. E. Woodbridge, *The Son of Apollo.*

and health, death and life, in terms of one formula. But life, especially when it becomes the good life, eludes the definition. Take a modern example in Albert Schweitzer. In the first place, he tries to bring all value under the heading of reverence for life.[29] But out of this formula come his problems as to differences of quality in life and the comparative worth of sacrifices when one life must give way to another. There is also the colossal difference between reverence for one's own life and for the life of one's neighbor, which Schweitzer tries, unavailingly as it seems to me, to gloss over. But look at the life Schweitzer has himself led! Who has more effectively combined the claims of *Leben* and *Geist?* Read what he says of his own sensitiveness to human and animal pain, read also his insistence on life-affirmation and his protest against the world-denying philosophies of the East. Then notice his disregard of pain and discomfort in himself, his recognition in his religious books of the paramount claims of abstract truth, and in his music the subordination and at the same time satisfaction of his instinctive desires in the worship of the master of abstractions, Bach. Truly, in his life nature is too subtle for any formula. Now my point is that the nearer our theories approach reality the more subtle and thus the more unstable they become. Take Plato once again. His argument,[30] as in the Philebus, starts out to be a theory of ethics and turns into an ontology, since ethics is demonstrable only in terms of metaphysics. But when he wants the nature of the real he finds it in the nature of the good. The forms can't exist apart in awful unmeaningness—this is a second-best view. But there is a separateness. If you have one thing it is because of another. God isn't God unless there is something to contrast him with. To be is to be definite. The democratic man is bad because he likes all things, the aristocratic man is good because he likes some things and not all. In the Sophist each metaphysical factor is distinct yet participates in all others. The forms cannot exist in isolation, yet the vision comes abruptly in the Symposium, and the return to earth in the Republic involves discontinuity. In the Theaetetus he says that something must always remain antagonistic to the good, and in the Republic he makes God the cause of a few things only. So in order to account for every-

[29] A. Schweitzer, *Civilization and Ethics.*
[30] This suggestion is from Professor Raphael Demos.

thing we need finally not only the limit and the unlimited, but God and what is appropriately called the mixture. Or you can call it patterns, receptable, God and the world of motion if you prefer. For my own part, I can see clearly the two creative factors—God and the world of motion. You can bring in forms and heralds and Eros if it makes it any clearer. But to me the forms are God and the motion is simply there as given, partly responsive to God and partly recalcitrant, as in the Timaeus, while Eros is the lure of God which again is a fact of experience even if not so prevalent a fact as we might wish.

Do you identify religious experience with the work of Eros then? asked Simmias.

I believe in the influence of Eros in ideas, forms, standards, values, said Cebes, and, while I find it difficult to explain, I have to come back to the fact that it clearly and obviously is there in many human cases. I doubt if it is more of a miracle than that which goes by the name of ideo-motor action. If any idea has a prominent place in consciousness there seems to be a definite drive toward its realization.

It must be comforting to the gangster to reflect that his crimes are simply the following out of ideo-motor action, said Simmias.

No, said Cebes, you will surely agree that there is a difference between good and bad ideas here. Psychologically the difference is that the good makes a fruitful object of meditation, and has been so acclaimed by mystics of all ages, while the evil is recognized as that which must be replaced by another. Logically one serves as a standard, the other is a defect. As to specific religious experience, all I have time to say now is that I believe it is possible to isolate the formal element in many different value situations, and to revere it as one recognizes and appreciates its claim. That is, I would follow Nygren[31] in saying that to call a thing valid is to raise it above the confines of the empirical world and to appeal to the religious category or *a priori*. I believe that there is a special experience of this validity-bringing element and that this is the real experience of God. The claim of the valid is certainly there in all our experiences of value whether we isolate it or not. As the phenomenologists have shown, an *a priori* judgment of the ought-to-be is implicit in all our judgments of

[31] A. Nygren, *Die Gültigkeit der religiösen Erfahrung*.

value. To put it in the language of current ethical controversy, it is the source of rules rather than the embodiment of ends. The ideal structure guides our judgments of the concrete situation when our judgments are correct. In our humanity we form the link between it and them. While human beings remain on the scene we cannot say that the Word is left without its witness. The ideal contains the seeds of its own actualization, and some fall upon good soil. Looking at it from the other point of view you can say that, where the world of motion is concerned, first there is that which is natural and then that which is spiritual. My only plea is that we do not look for the spiritual merely in the natural and that we do not hold the spirit accountable for the shambles which nature has made. God is not in the entire process, nor was he prominent at the beginning. He seems to develop with the process, and the completion of his power and influence comes clearly in the experiences of men.

Haven't you really legislated God out of all existence? asked Simmias, and haven't you ignored the God of comfort who comes with healing in his wings? This seems to me to have been the truly important God of the historic religions.

I think that I have rather asked in the first place for a more lively conception of what both the existence of God and the knowledge of God can mean, Cebes replied. I still protest against the techniques of science in religion and ask rather for a return to the age-old theological problems. As to the God of comfort, I believe that problem ultimately will have to be solved in terms of the comfort which comes from alignment of conscience and will with the absolute value. Perhaps we can use the insight of the Reformers into the relation of freedom and grace. Freedom is the sign of the presence of spirit and of the two worlds between which the spirit must choose. Grace is perhaps a word to describe the working of God in that there is a large element of determinism in all freedom. We sometimes forget that the Puritans who had enough enthusiasm for freedom to come to America in order to find it also believed fervently in divine control and guidance. This may be the element to notice in all these apocalyptic gospels from Mark to Marx and from Nahum to Niebuhr. Our approach to the crisis of God should perhaps be with anxiety as well as love. But to me the anxiety is over our attainment of the ideal, not

over God's majesty and might. The power of God affects men's souls and not their bodies. If you fear God because he can cast both soul and body into hell, you fear not God but a devil. The power is that of an essence, not an existence, and resides in the worshipper as much as in the object worshipped. As for the metaphysical treatment of this power, I would go back once more to James's comment on the rightness of certain relations and our perception of them. Then I would call on Gestalt psychology to show how these relations exist not merely in our perceptions. But that is another story, and a long one.

Once again, said Simmias, I must insist that you have lost yourself in idle speculations, as proof of which I would remark that you started out to discuss the question of church and state and have now left them so far behind that a return is impossible and a new start will have to be made.

On the contrary, said Cebes, I would say that our conversation represents the fluctuation which is a necessary part of the moving reality in which we find ourselves. And if we have pursued truth in the realm of religion we may be helped to see clearly in the realm of politics. Now in terms of this contrast between formal and empirical, I would say that the church, if true to itself must always represent the formal, while the state must represent the empirical. The church must always face, as does the liberal church today, the real possibility that it should put itself out of existence. It may be that an entirely new type of organization is required and that our present denominational set-up is no longer helpful. In that case the church must die to live, and if true to its own genius it will be willing to die. But the state can never take such an attitude, for the state is in genesis and nature utilitarian, and not ideal. It exists for happiness, not truth. It cannot face the prospect of a world-state and so it arms to fight for its own provincialism. If the world-state ever comes it will be because form has finally imposed itself on reluctant political reality. Nationalism means the life of the instincts in all their competitive rivalry. Its ideal can only be the superman and the satisfaction of desire. And its driving force, as we see it today, in the armament race, is fear. The church may have dropped to this level in the past, but whenever it has done so it has forfeited its right to represent

true religion. The real message of the church lies in its teaching of asceticism and denial. Barth is right with his resounding "Ich sage—Nein!" But the church teaches men to say No on behalf of a greater Yes, to renounce war for love, political jealousy for reason, private loyalties for public good. Religion is the undying fire in the hearts of men which flickers and fails today as greed and pride prevail. But it will burn more brightly when men see in it a reflection of the light of the eternal values which accompany the struggle toward truth and justice, as the stars accompany the march across the plains.

PROPHECY AND POLITICS: A STUDY IN MARTIN LUTHER

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The connexion of prophetic religion with politics is rapidly becoming the crucial issue in modern Christianity, and the relation of divine to human activity in the social sphere is undoubtedly the theological dogma most needing adequate definition. In the light of this it may not be inappropriate to study the work of Luther in its political aspects. The perennial problem of politics and prophecy did not escape Luther, indeed, the course of the Reformation in Germany is intelligible only in the light of this issue.

Like all prophets Luther started from an assurance of the Will of God and every step he made in the long, turbulent course of German reconstruction was directly related to this fundamental conviction. "God's will be done" was his constant inspiration to action and because, in the last analysis, social and religious organization is dependent upon political power, the will of God for him—as for every prophet—was inseparable from political action.

History has not seldom shown a pattern of political development that prophetic thinking follows. Certainly Luther's political activity can be conveniently divided into four distinct phases, which, like all historical periods, are not distinguished by clear edges but rather by rising peaks of climax. Luther started as a political optimist, believing that the religious and social reconstruction of Germany could be accomplished by an appeal to the Imperial power. Such indeed is the purpose of his *Address to the Christian Nobility*. This early optimism is followed by disillusionment, and Luther's condemnation at the Diet of Worms ushers us into a second period of political pessimism. His idea of Christianity became increasingly otherworldly and he drew a sharp differentiation between the secular and spiritual powers, such as he outlined in his treatise *On Secular Authority*. The root of this distinction lies in the conviction that Christianity is pledged to passive obedience in worldly matters and to resistance without the use of force in spiritual affairs. This second stage is but

an interim and the course of events invariably proves that it is itself a denial of prophetic religion. Truth does not convince the world and passive obedience does not alter it. So the prophet is forced on to a further stage of revolution, in which the compulsion of the will of God is the final justification of war and rebellion. This is evident in Luther's writing during the period of the Schmalkaldic League. The fatal climax of this position is realised in the final sanctification of political power, which marked the last period of Luther's life. The Instructions for the Saxon Churches and the organization of the Consistories laid the foundation for *Landesherrliche Kirchenregiment,* or territorial, political Lutheranism, and demonstrated the tragic capitulation of prophetic insight to political power, which history has again and again witnessed.

It would not be hard to show some modern parallels to these four phases of prophetic religion in politics. The liberal beliefs of much modern religious education are marked by political optimism. Barthianism is characterised by political pessimism and passive obedience in worldly matters, and what is now called "Radical Christianity" is distinguished by its emphasis on the need for revolution. An example of the fourth stage is found in the German Christians, though it must be borne in mind that this is the inevitable danger which faces the triumph of any prophetic political action.

Before proceeding to an analysis of Luther's writings in these four periods, it may be helpful to mention some of the historical elements that distinguish Luther's problem from our own, and to point out some very essential factors in the attitude from which he approached the issues.

In the first place, every problem was to Luther a religious problem, and he saw every human activity from the point of view of the will of God. His warfare with the Roman Church and the imperial power was waged to establish the freedom of Protestant belief and worship. It cannot be denied that this freedom as he conceived it had its limits, for Luther clearly saw that freedom is not license and the problem of freedom is really the problem of discipline. Then again he regarded it his special mission to break the "demonic" power of the Roman Church, which had confused its earthly existence with the *Civitas Dei* and had identified the outward symbols of religion with the true life in Christ. Finally, it was always from the point of view of God's

activity that he approached religion. Luther's peculiar emphasis here can be explained to a certain extent by his revolt against the semi-pelagianism of the later scholastics, such as Duns Scotus and Occam. Nevertheless, this itself is only intelligible in the light of that basic Christian experience, which forever distinguishes the Christian from the followers of Liberal Judaism and Ethical Christianity, or, as Luther called them, Jews and Sophists. The Word of God, to use Luther's phrase, seizes man and faith is the result neither of ascetic discipline, nor of penance, nor of man's intellectual effort, but of the power of God.

This stress on God's initiative and God's activity has great importance for Luther's political ideas, because it determines his view of man and of secular government. The only time he indulges in a philosophy of the state he affirms the essentially evil character of man and the necessary chaos of all social life were it not for God's initiative in instituting government, which would restrain the evil passions of men. He lacks that sounder view of his great master Augustine, who conceived of man's nature as essentially social, and had spoken in his *Confessions* of a *pactum societatis* which perhaps did more justice to the Christian view of man.

There is, nevertheless, a significant insight in this doctrine of Luther. What is necessary and inevitable, in Luther, is divine, and since it is the nature of social life to need constituted government he regards the ground of its existence as the will of God. He may not see clearly enough that government is always an expression of social power, but he does recognise that it is the only possible basis of some kind of "rough justice"—or *concordia*, as Augustine calls it. It is this idea, never clearly explicit in Luther, but always presupposed, that gives him a possible criterion for princely authority. On the other hand, his doctrine that all governments are divinely instituted can never provide a social justification for rebellion, such as there is theoretically in Aquinas, and the religious justification of revolt that Luther finally advocated came only after many years of hesitation and the constant political pressure of his friends.

Another factor that must be borne in mind is that the reformation idea of the divine right of the king (or, for Luther, the territorial prince) stands in opposition to the divine right claimed by the Papacy in politics. The full significance of the democratic ideas of Marsilius

of Padua was not appreciated by Luther, and though the idea of a General Council was espoused by him in the sphere of the Church, secular government could never be democratic. Within the Church there could, in a sense, be responsible democracy, but never within the state. For government was founded and instituted by God for the very reason that the people were irresponsible. Such was the political result of Luther's doctrine of man.

To Luther, the political problem revolved around the relations of the two great civil powers of the 16th century,—the territorial and the imperial. Both he regarded as divinely instituted and to both he made an appeal for the reconstruction of the religious and social life of Germany. The people, or the masses, he never regarded as a legitimate power who could express themselves in government. The rebellion of the people against constituted authority spelt always for him chaos and confusion. His dark view of the nature of man led him to deny the very possibility of democratic government, and he saw in the Münster tragedy of 1534 an apparent justification of his position. Münster was an example not of government but of license. In judging Luther this must be constantly borne in mind. If we want to draw a parallel between the prophetic activity of Luther in politics and that of modern Christianity we must recognise the difference in the historic idiom. In the 16th century and for Luther the contrast of power lay between the territorial and the imperial—both divinely instituted, —for us the struggle is rather between organised capital and organised labour—both based upon the myth of democracy.

In the first period Luther's political opinions are determined by an ill-founded and youthful optimism. His *Address to the Christian Nobility*[1] is based upon the assumption that not only the new Emperor from whom the German nationalists expected so much, but the Christian nobles themselves would realise wherein their true interests and duty lay once these were clearly pointed out. In his treatise Luther first disposes of the "satanic" presumptions of the Romanists and with his doctrine of the priesthood of all believers breaks down the three straw walls of the papal hierarchy and its claims to an absolute *plenitudo potestatis*. Luther then turns his attention to the vital subject of his appeal. He writes clearly and directly, with vigour and conviction. Germany is in need; distress and misery of a social as well

[1] *An den Christlichen Adel deutscher Nation*, 1520.

as of a religious character have wasted the German Estates. He lays down a programme—a kind of *agenda*—for a reforming council and advocates many sound and sane reforms for the guidance of the secular rulers themselves.

A literary battle of more magnitude than worth has long been waged over the limits that Luther set to secular jurisdiction in this treatise. The very possibility of this debate gives some grounds for supposing that Luther's mind was not altogether clear on the subject and certainly he evinces no massive erudition on the subject of law. Generally he is little concerned with the minutiae of law, and canon law he certainly maintains is the work of the devil. His general outline, nevertheless, is clear. There are certain purely spiritual matters which belong to the province of the General Council; then there are borderline matters (such as *annates*, education, etc.) which can be dealt with either by the temporal authorities or by the General Council. Finally there are purely temporal matters for the secular power, such as sumptuary laws, usury and prostitution. He regards it as expedient that the temporal authorities should call the Council, but here they, as fellow-priests, would be representing all Christians.

Such, in brief, is his idea. The reforms he urges contain much sound common sense and are wide in their scope. His denunciation of monopolies, his contention "that we should find some bridle for the Fuggers and similar companies," his ideas for the regulation of marriages and pauperism, and his suggestions for the sumptuary laws, show him as a reformer of much practical insight and one who has at heart the well-being of his native Germany. He has a pretty clear idea of the will of God in all its relationships and he has in mind an ideal Germany of a social and political as well as of a purely religious character. "If anything," he writes, "is contrary to God's will and harmful to men in body and soul, not only has any community, council or government authority to prevent and abolish such wrong . . . but it is their duty as they value their soul's salvation." It is interesting to notice that even in temporal affairs Luther adduces scripture as the final authority in determining the will of God, though in no sense is Luther a Bible literalist.

From such visions of an ideal Germany Luther was rudely awakened. The adverse decisions of the diets of Worms and Nüremberg

convinced him that the world of politics was far more evil than he ever dreamed, and that national aspiration was a force far less potent than the "demons of Romanism." He now fell into complete political pessimism and attempted a solution of the problem by a sharp differentiation of the ecclesiastical and secular authorities. His dreams of a reformed political and social Germany vanished, and he tended to regard Christianity as essentially other-worldly. He temporarily abandoned political aid, became assured that princes were not only "rare birds in heaven" but "the greatest fools or the worst knaves on earth," and sought consolation in a purified, spiritual Church, which would shed abroad the light of the knowledge of the will of God. To this period belongs his famous treatise *On Secular Authority*,[2] which has too often been considered Luther's final position in the matter. The purpose of this work is to differentiate the two spheres of politics and religion, and to show that the government of the heavenly Kingdom is quite unrelated to that of the earthly. The extent of earthly government goes "no farther than to life and property and what is external upon earth. For over the soul God can and will let no one rule but Himself." Hence in religious questions—questions, that is, of faith and conscience—the secular power can have no authority. Heresy is the province of bishops, not of princes. If the secular prince becomes a tyrant and overreaches himself by enforcing religious laws the believer may and must resist, but this resistance can never go to the limit of force. The believer must bear the consequences of his action. If, for instance, by refusing to render up the New Testament you are thrown into prison or have your property confiscated, "Thank God," says Luther, "that you are worthy to suffer for the sake of the Divine Word, and let (the tyrant) rave, the fool that he is." Force belongs to the civil power, and the Christian owes obedience to the secular ruler who is appointed by God. The world is too wicked to deserve many wise and pious princes, and hence the rare Christian is almost bound to be ruled by a wicked government. Nevertheless, he serves the government because others stand in need of it, "that they may be protected and the wicked may not become worse."

This differentiation of the two spheres has a tragic effect upon Luther's notion of the Church as well as on his idea of government. If he tends to regard the latter as black, tyrannical and stupid, he is

[2] *Von Weltlicher Obrigkeit*, 1523.

equally open to paint idyllic pictures of the Church that have no reality. Among Christians, he says, there can be no government, since "no one desires to be the other's superior, but each the other's inferior." The Christian never takes personal vengeance through a court of law or in any other way. Further, Luther maintains that the will and consent of each congregation is necessary for the passing of religious decrees—again something that had no existence in the 16th century, and least of all in Luther's actual reconstruction of the Church. All the problems of church discipline, which Luther later discovered were inseparable from some kind of secular authority, are thus left unresolved, indeed unmentioned.

Although driven to its logical conclusion this separation of ecclesiastical and secular authority would leave the two powers quite unrelated, Luther's good sense overcomes his logic, a frequent characteristic of his writing. There is always the possibility of a Christian prince, and while supposedly the prince has no official power in the Church, his political action is determined by Christian conduct, and thus politics in some sense comes under the criterion of Church. Luther appends to his treatise a chapter on the Christian prince and adds some shrewd maxims of government. The prince must care for his subjects, and if this is taken seriously Luther remarks "full many a fine dance and hunt and race and game will have to be abandoned." At times Luther's sense of a religious ethic overcomes his shrewdness and he denies the right of a Christian prince to wage even a just war against his overlord.

The kind of rough justice which Luther conceived it to be the function of the secular government to enforce is admirably illustrated by a story he relates of the Duke of Burgundy. A certain nobleman took an enemy prisoner. The prisoner's wife, agitated over the fate of her husband, went to the noble to plead for his release. This the noble said he would grant on one condition—that she become his mistress for a night. In desperation she asked the consent of her husband, which he, considering freedom of more value than ignominy, readily granted. This time the prince turned out to be not the greatest fool but probably the greatest knave in Christendom, for the next day he presented the wife with the head of her husband, whom he had had decapitated. In her consternation she now sought the help of the Duke of Burgundy. He, being a wise and pious prince, forced the noble to

marry the outraged wife. Immediately after the wedding, however, the Duke had the noble beheaded, so the new bride, although a second time a widow, greatly rejoiced for she became heir to all the noble's lands and possessions and, we suppose, lived happily ever afterwards. Such is Luther's idea of *concordia.*

It was during this period of political pessimism that Luther produced his violent pamphlet against the peasants.[3] No other justification for it can be offered than that Luther sincerely believed that such revolution accomplishes nothing, never results in the desired reformation and hurts the innocent more than the guilty. He had, in 1525, written an Exhortation defending the 12 Articles of the peasants and rebuking the nobles and especially the bishops for their conduct. He had definitely urged the granting of some of these petitions. When, however, the peasants resorted to force, he saw the devil let loose. Only chaos, he believed, could result from this wild and reckless tumult and so, convinced that the peasants were doing the devil's work under pretence of the Gospel, he advised the magistrates "to stab, kill and strangle them like mad dogs." The only legitimate course for the wronged and oppressed to pursue he had outlined in his *Earnest Exhortation* of 1522. It is alone lawful to prevail upon the authorities: the duties of the people lie in the recognition of their sin, in prayer, in humility, and in speaking and writing to spread abroad the knowledge of God. This is the only way to achieve social or religious reformation. Slay with words, he says, "Make your mouth a mouth of the Holy Spirit. . . . The mouth of Christ must do it."

Luther, however, could not long remain an advocate of this position. The tragic results of the Reichstag of Augsburg convinced him that the word of truth did not slay and the power of the Romanists was not broken by the spreading abroad of the Gospel. He was then forced into open revolution and his support of the Schmalkaldic League was a definite defiance of the imperial power. It is very important to notice that here is a question of two constituted authorities, one of which he believes to be the tool of the "demonic" Romanists. The issue does not concern open popular revolt. This he condemns with insistence from first to last. The overthrowing of the government by the people is revolt against God, because God has instituted every government to check sin, but the struggle of one government

[3] *Wider die mörderischen und räuberischen Rotten der Bauern,* 1529.

against another is a different matter. In this latter case the question to be considered is which of two governments is legitimate and which tyrannical.

Luther regards every problem from the religious point of view and this is especially clear in his attitude of defiance to the imperial power. Tyranny concerns religion and only religion, and is marked by the secular attempt to institute by force the Roman doctrines. Clearly enough Luther has in mind the power of the Romanists rather than the social good or evil of the imperial authority, though this latter issue is by no means absolutely extinguished. For right religion, in Luther, always has its concomitant social benefits, especially in the field of education. Luther's fundamental justification for defying the Emperor is that the latter has become the mere tool of the Pope. "If the Emperor," he writes, "should declare war on the Pope's behalf or on account of our teaching, let no one abet his purpose or show him obedience, but be assured that God utterly forbids him to obey his command. . . . For the Emperor in this matter acts not only against God and His divine law, but against his own imperial law, oath and obligation."[4] Like Pharaoh the Romanists have hardened their hearts and in their attempt to crush the Gospel are the enemies of God rushing to their doom in the Red Sea. It is they that have chosen the policy of bloodshed, and resistance to such murderers and bloodhounds is no rebellion. If they declare war the sin is on their heads and they must be met with similar force. "If it is lawful to defend ourselves against the Turk, then it is still more lawful to do so against the Pope, who is even worse. Since the Emperor has associated himself with the defenders of the Pope he must expect to be treated as his wickedness deserves. . . . If they (Pope, Cardinals and Emperor) wish to stone Christians, then their stones will recoil on their own heads."

Luther finally recognises the duty as well as the right of the prince to repel force with force and declares, "In hitherto teaching that it is not permissible to resist constituted authority we were unaware that the law itself permits such resistance."[5] He will admit, then, that occasions do arise when the resistance of the secular authority is legitimate, and he emphasises that the doctors of the law have established in what cases this is permissible. Luther, however, only clearly recognises one

[4] *Warnung an seine lieben Deutschen*, 1531.
[5] *Werke*, Erlangen Ed. vol. 64, p. 269-70; written probably Nov., 1530.

occasion, viz. when a higher authority attempts to enforce upon an inferior authority a religious doctrine directly opposed to Holy Scripture. The Augsburg Confession, he maintained, had incontestably proven that his doctrine was founded upon the Word of God, and to root this out by the ruthless tyranny of the imperial power is to wage war against the will of God. Such writings of Luther against the Emperor are permeated through and through with the spirit of German nationalism. He is conscious of defending his Germany against the irresponsible tyranny of a foreign power. He writes, "I am the Prophet of the Germans, this high sounding title I am obliged to assume to please my asinine Papists—I will act as faithful teacher and warn my staunch Germans of the danger in which they stand."

The checkered political events in Europe at the time led Charles V to seek some kind of compromise and open warfare with the Protestants was delayed. Luther, however, had won his cause and henceforward, under the patronage of the Elector of Saxony, he was able to reconstruct the German Church in a territorial area. This process had indeed begun as early as the Diet of Speier (1526), but it now reached its climax. Luther sanctified the secular power which had paved the way for his triumph, and we enter the final period of his prophetic and political career. In 1526[6] he wrote to the Elector to institute measures for his reconstruction and to appoint "Visitors" to reorganise the Church. He emphasises that the Prince's initiative here was purely one of expedience—a Notepiscopat—as he called it: for none of us, he says, had a calling or clear commission for this, and therefore "we have humbly implored His Electoral Grace to call and ordain persons for this office" (of the Electoral Visitation).[7, 8]

It is beyond our purpose to examine at length the details of this visitation and the overwhelming problems of disorder and license that had to be met. The setting up of the Consistories, however, affords a good example of Luther's sanctification of the secular power. The old episcopal consistories for ecclesiastical discipline were revised in

[6] *Werke*, Erlangen Ed. vol. 53, pp. 386-8.

[7] Preface to the Saxon *Visitationsunterricht*, 1528.

[8] While these examples antedate the struggle with the imperial power they logically succeed it. The events in the actual historical situation in Europe at the time, particularly Charles' preoccupation with foreign wars, were responsible for the delay of the imperial authority in joining issue directly with the Protestant Estates. This made it possible for Luther to begin the organization of the territorial churches before the open warfare with the Emperor.

a secular form. Civil courts, nominated by the Elector, heard all cases and enforced their decisions with civil penalties.[9] It is true that the emergency of the situation and the immediate necessity of organization and discipline may have justified some such expediency, and that Luther constantly tried to limit the wide powers that the Elector has assumed in the *Instruction* to the Saxon Churches. In his preface to this document Luther had attempted to make clear that the Elector cannot "teach and exercise spiritual rule," and his activity in the ecclesiastical realm is limited to preventing divisions and tumults among his subjects. Nevertheless, the Church in Saxony was dominated by the civil power and the result of Luther's reformation was the identification of the Church with territorial interests. It was an example *par excellence* of what the Roman Church had tried to avoid since the time of Charlemagne and the Saxon Emperors. By enforcing the celibacy of the clergy the mediaeval Church had waged ceaseless warfare against the identification of ecclesiastical with territorial interests, but this very identification became the basis of the Lutheran Church. Precisely for that reason Luther's own ideas on toleration were rapidly changing. Uniformity of worship, confession and ecclesiastical usage were enforced, and while a man might in secret hold heretical views, all disunity and division fostered by insubordinate preachers was suppressed by the civil power. The Church of Christ became the Church of Electoral Saxony, and Luther's peculiar idea of the will of God was worked out through political measures. This eventually led, at the peace of Augsburg, to *cuius regio, eius religio,* which became the tragic motto for the politics of prophecy. Luther had once written,[10] "Satan continues to be Satan. Under the Pope he mixed up the Church with politics, in our times he seeks to mix up politics with the Church." He might with some truth have added later, "But Luther does not continue to be Luther. Under the Pope he divorced the Church from politics, in these times he seeks to identify politics with the Church."

The essential difficulty with Luther's position lies in his lack of an adequate eschatology. He had no immanent Kingdom in history. He

[9] This needs a certain amount of qualification. While Luther had in general approved of these Consistories, he was opposed to anything that would revive the great excommunication of the old episcopal régime. Perhaps his influence in this direction is evident in the fact that the Elector never put into force the civil penalties of a purely religious excommunication.

[10] *Briefe,* Walch Ed. vol. 5, p. 596.

had no ideal earthly Church-State. Politics and religion were to him always distinct and unrelated areas, and hence he was able so easily to divorce them or identify them, according to the pressure of political events. Politics was a mere expedient, never an end. It was to be denied when it crushed Protestant religion and to be embraced when it affirmed it, but its nature was essentially transitory. Church had to do with the transcendent Kingdom, the imminence of which Luther frequently stressed, but politics was only concerned with preserving a kind of peace and rough justice among wicked men who were bound to be damned anyway. Luther, whose doctrine of the Church was probably one of the soundest that the Reformation produced because it was most clearly based on the unity of faith and community, had no adequate appreciation of the nature and function of politics. He never applied the doctrine of the Incarnation to the life of society as a whole. The reason for this perhaps lay in a too gloomy idea of the nature of man—even of Christian man so far as his temporal life was concerned.

The problem of the sanctification of political power is as vital to modern prophetic religion as it was to Luther. There is, however, one factor which clearly distinguishes our situation from Luther's. He failed to escape the danger because of his overemphasis on the transcendent Kingdom; our danger lies in the opposit direction, in an overemphasis on the immanent Kingdom in history. Therefore is the peril for us doubly acute, for all the infallibility and divine character of the transcendent Kingdom is likely to be applied to the Kingdom in history. Modern radical religion has as its eschatology a kind of secular chiliasm, which displays not a few of the fallacies that beset the fervid apocalyptic of the Anabaptists in Luther's generation. The religious fanaticism and ruthless political tyranny of the New Jerusalem of Bernhard Rothman are not unlike many radical dreams of a reformed Christian politics. It is for us to work out an eschatology which grasps the relation of divine to human activity and sees the vital connexion of the immanent Kingdom of history with the transcendent Kingdom of God. Both must have their appropriate place if we would avoid the danger of the sanctification of political power that besets all prophetic religion.

RELIGION AND "NATURAL HISTORY"

By Fritz Marti
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In Schelling's unfinished book *Die Weltalter*, presumably written before 1814, we find the following passage: "What could occupy God before he created the world? This is a question which is so natural that even children will ask it. And indeed, it seems necessary to conceive of a duration of that as yet inarticulate state of things, provided that creation is to be thought of as a free act. Still, upon closer scrutiny, the concept of such a duration appears as unthinkable, since eternity, in itself and by itself, has no duration. Only time has duration, in contrast with eternity. Hence, that eternity before the world vanishes immediately into nothing or, what is the same, into a mere moment. The teachers usually find a way out of the difficulty by dodging the question. But leaving without answer such questions which strike even a child, is the very cause of the general lack of faith." (307)[1]

If, according to Schelling, the obviously false conception of eternity as duration causes a lack of faith, our apologists must not expect a great revival to result from a restatement of the obvious. To be true, that erroneous conception of eternity must be corrected. But a more pernicious though less obvious error is involved. It is the misconception of creation. The persistence of this error would seem to explain the insistent yet sterile occupation of some theologians with cosmology. These theological cosmologists wish to revive faith by means of erecting their theology on a naturalistic basis. We might remind them, of course, that the faith thus attained would have to be Stoic rather than Christian.

However, I have no mind to contribute to ecclesiastical apologetics. Nor am I at all inclined to set up any private theism or pantheism, after the fashion which accompanies periods of enlightenment, like ours. I share the eschatological feeling of the children of enlightenment, and it makes me wary of both traditional and invented answers offered in the uncritical terms of naïve questions. Yet, I do not follow

[1] Page references are to volume VIII of Schelling's works (J. G. Cotta, Stuttgart und Augsburg, 1861).

the fanatics of enlightenment who would make us believe that all naïve questions are unphilosophical. And the childlike question about what happened before creation strikes me as being pregnant with problems which cut at the very root of our knowledge of nature. I here propose to deal, in part at least, with the deep meaning of the very conception of creation.

To me, it means the undoing of the notion of reality as a sequence of events which simply supersede each other, either irrationally, or after the pattern of mechanistic laws in which time is a mere parameter. I do not mean to say that, in the historical development of human thought, irrationalism or mechanism came first and the conception of creation arose as a correction of them. I merely hold that creation means either divine arbitrariness within a nature dependent on this very foundation, and therefore basically unreal, or it means that in nature itself there is a growth of the new from the old—that the old is not merely superseded but made into the past of the new which thus alone comes to pass. I do not deny that the first and childish one of these two meanings can be found in religion, but it is my thesis that the second and only justifiable meaning is what redeems religion, in this controversy about creation.

However, I am anticipating, and I will start my argument with an analysis of the conception of acts of God. I cannot dismiss as thoughtless the naïve notion of acts of God, in nature. This notion, I believe, is not originally limited to calamities such as floods and plagues. No doubt, the phrase, acts of God, is also used by thoughtless people who would be called religious—people who conceive of God as a cosmic stage-manager, an odd job man, a scavenger, and eventually a scapegoat. Such notions, most impious as they are, still do pass for religion, since there are still people who seem to believe that using the name of God is a proof of religiosity. We may even find those notions in the minds of genuinely religious people, and then they meet with our forbearance. For the essence of genuine religiosity lies beyond such notions; it lies in man's sense of the eternal in reality. And it is the *eternal* in nature which the man of true piety means when he speaks of acts of God.

According to this phrase and conception, whatever is, in nature, is a fact, in the root sense of the word: factum. It has been done, by God.

Unphilosophical minds interpret this conception in a merely temporal sense, taking the acts of God as contingent events in time. This is a twofold misinterpretation. An act of God is nothing contingent; it is eternal. And eternity is not a matter of time, although time may prove to depend on eternity.

There is, in ecclesiastical parlance, an ostensible synonym for the eternal: the everlasting. And rash interpreters jump to the conclusion that the everlasting explains what the eternal means. The opposite is true. Even Platonism would point out that duration must be explained in terms of the timeless. But the Christian era felt that timeless ideas could never account for the historical reality of the temporal. The assumption of an arbitrary and therefore inexplicable act of a Demiurge who shapes the temporal world after the pattern of the timeless idea will never account for the simple and majestic dignity of nature. Nature simply is. It is not a contingent occurrence in an otherwise empty time. Nor is time a merely accidental attribute of nature. Nature is genuinely temporal. Somehow, it must be historical. And it is this historical character of nature to which the phrase, acts of God, must refer.

Acts of God are not contingent events in an indifferent time. No true act is contingent. And whatever the qualification act *of God* may signify, we ought to grant, at least, that the word *act* might prove significant if taken philosophically, not anthropomorphically.

An act, properly speaking, is no mere event, nor is it arbitrary. Very naïve people believe that they act freely when they act arbitrarily, when they do as they please. Even a naturalistic philosophy would remind them that this good pleasure of theirs is not, in turn, 'as they please,' but is conditioned by their own past about which they merely forget. Arbitrariness simply means to yield unawares to the past. Thus, arbitrariness has the appearance of a contingent event.

To act, however, means precisely to do away with contingency. It means to do what is meet and, thus, to overcome the past. Our true acts do not spring from nothing, they rest on our past. Yet, without our action, the past would persist as it was. It would modify the present, but it would not be modified and made into a real past which is no longer what it was. To act means to posit a past, to set it down as past, and thus to overcome it. Overcoming the past means freedom,—

real freedom, not that apparent liberty to do as we please. Freedom and necessity are one and the same. And this identity constitutes the realm of the spirit, the realm of our history, and hence—I think—the realm of nature.

True enough, neither naturalistic thought, nor religious words can reach this reality of which we may speak in terms borrowed from Schelling, saying that real is what has a "decided past" and, hence, a "true present" (259).

For naturalistic thought, whose enthusiasm has been voiced most intensely, perhaps, by Anaximandros, the present merely supplants the past and is in turn supplanted by the future. Naturalism may speak of evolution and progress; yet it cannot conceive of historical life. Life deposits the past by means of positing it (if I may thus render the double meaning of the Hegelian term 'aufheben'); the past is kept alive by doing away with it. This dialectical reality does not enter into naturalistic notions. But it does enter into the speculative conceptions of religion. It is my thesis that the conceptions of creation, and of acts of God, would be meaningless unless they referred to this nature of historical reality, and hence, I believe, to the historical character of nature, to an actual "natural history."

But these religious conceptions must be understood philosophically. Often the words creation and acts of God are taken for mere anthropomorphisms, by both infidels and shallow believers alike. The latter may even hope to benefit by God's arbitrary power over nature, expecting him to arrange things more pleasantly for them. They are fundamentally impious, since they do not humbly accept their station as creatures. They literally lack religion, if the word 'religio' means to own the ties that hold us within the whole of creation by means of our nature, which is what constitutes our human task. Genuine religion binds us back into our own nature, and thus, into nature at large. In the words of tradition, religion tells us to acknowledge that we are creatures, and it summons us to be of good cheer, as creatures. Truly, if we can gain this simple confidence in our own place, we are attaining the happiness of the good life.

Those men whom we call sound, and solid, and genuine, and real, have that basic confidence in themselves, in their own substance—that confidence which shows a unity of spirit and nature. For, man's substantial decisions spring from his nature, although they cannot

be called decisions, nor are they his, unless this nature has acquired the dignity of a decided past. I quote a few sentences from *Die Weltalter* (259): "A man who has not overcome himself has no past, or rather, he never gets out of his past, he lives in it all the time. . . . Only a man who has the strength to tear himself away from himself (from what is subordinate in him)—only such an one is capable of making a past for himself, and he alone enjoys a true present and looks forward to a genuine future." Schelling continues: "Even these ethical considerations will make clear that no present is possible but what rests upon a decided past, and no past but what underlies a present, as overcome by it." And indeed, I should say, it is not merely an ethical matter. Although our freedom demands that our nature become our past, and the spirit our present, the very relation of present to past implies that we cannot live in spirit alone. We must have confidence in our nature, which is not of our making. We must trust in God, says religion. And the words on our coins might be taken as a true expression of a sense of creature dignity, if it were permissible to forget about the thoughtlessness which is impotent to master the words of the past, and which repeats them slavishly, instead of making them voice the free present.

The past, by itself, would enslave us, being no past but a haunting presence. But if we master it, it proves to be what is concrete in our freedom. And our past is not of the spirit alone. 'Genius is born,' we say. And without roots in human nature, there would never be personalities 'making history.' History is made by making a past out of the merely natural. If the natural were not thus mastered, we should call it unnatural, abnormal. Human nature finds its norm in becoming the decided past of a true present. And this relation of past and present is neither a mere temporal sequence, nor a timeless law. It is the mastery of time, and of the temporal. It is what may properly be called the eternal.

Only in such mastery can man find reality. Only in history. Thus, history is the realm where things really happen. History is no contingent and arbitrary play moving on a heavenly stage. It is reality, happening in the midst of nature, and from nature. Man's nature, then, need not be torn from the context of nature at large. Man is a creature, and his history springs from nature. But his nature becomes real, and human, only in his history. And what we call history, in the

sense of historical knowledge, proves to be the real 'natural science' about man. In human history, human nature finds itself, its actual reality. Now, if the nature of man is no unnatural exemption from nature at large, must we not ask whether nature as such can be at all exempt from the relation of past and present? Must not nature as such have its history? And is not the essence of science 'natural history'?

I have no ready answer to this question. It strikes me, though, that perhaps a man as keenly natural and as much master of himself as Socrates, may have been speaking very much to the point when, taking his cue from Anaxagoras, he made the claim that nature must find its reality in 'Nous.' Socrates seems to have taken this to mean that the method even of natural science must be teleological. Meanwhile, we have learned from the scientific impotence of traditional theology that the teleological interpretation of the relation of present to past is inadequate. The prefixed ends of teleology would appear to establish a real dependence of the present on the future, but they cannot furnish a ground for the present in the past. They are, therefore, just as unilateral and unsatisfactory as the antecedents on which mechanism rests everything. Neither mechanism nor teleology can know of a time in which things really happen. Neither has access to nature, to the nature which underlies history. Nor can they comprehend history, that is the rise of the spirit, which finds itself as having a real past.

According to Schelling, nature is the past of God.[2] Obviously not a past that is dead, and done for, but, as Schelling says, an "eternal past" (254). "God, with respect to his highest self, *is* not revealed, he is revealing himself; he is not real, he becomes real. This, in order that he appear as the freest of all beings (*das allerfreieste Wesen*)." (308)

Perhaps, I should apologize for resting my case here, since such sentences as the ones just quoted sound like theological dogmas, and since I cannot claim them as my own decided past. This much is certain, both the naturalistic theorist and the non-speculative religious thinker are bound to miss the living continuity of history. To them

[2] "Nature is an abyss of the past." (243)—"The claim of an eternally posited past in God himself." (197 and 254)—"We do not know God in any way but in relation to an eternal nature subordinated to him." (259)—*Et passim.*

it must appear as a matter of contingency—as a riddle. Contingent events occur in an indifferent and therefore abstract time, and they require a deterministic and therefore endless explanation. Its endlessness can be done away with only in appearance and by dogmatic decree. This, incidentally, is why the religious dogmatist feels that the endless tale of naturalism gives him a fine chance to finish the story. Mythological thinking mistakes finished stories for living history.

But conscientious religiosity corrects the stories which the religions tell about the plan of nature and of history. Truly religious sense feels that creation is act, that nature is historical. What is implicit in that religious sense of reality, philosophy makes explicit and applicable in science and history. The problem of a nature that is not only of the books and laboratories calls for a recognition of history. And real history, in turn, demands the "religio" of spirit and nature, the spirit's recollection of the nature from which it takes its issue.

THE SOCIAL TECHNIQUES OF CHRISTIANITY

By Robert E. Fitch
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There exists today a fairly large body of literature which attempts to define the social aims and applications of Christianity. What is striking is the amazing paucity of discussion of the social techniques of Christianity. Whether conservative or radical, Christian leaders seem to have quite explicit notions of the ends they wish to accomplish; but, when it comes to the question of the right method to accomplish these ends, they often exhibit an incredible degree of confusion and uncertainty. In my opinion, it is this confusion with regard to techniques, rather than with regard to aims, which has destroyed so much of the unanimity of action which the church might display, and has often led it, not only into practical contradictions, but even into the betrayal of its own ideals. The ensuing discussion is an attempt to clarify the relationship of the church to the state, and to indicate in precisely what manner the one institution should act upon the other.

I

There are, perhaps, only three basic types of social philosophy, three fundamental theories of the inter-relationship of groups and institutions.

There is the totalitarian theory, which assumes that one institution shall include and dominate all others. This would be symbolized by one circle, including other circles within it. There is the theory of absolute pluralism, which assumes that each institution is a unique and independent entity, only externally and superficially related to other institutions. This would be symbolized by a cluster of separate and distinct circles, each entirely external to the others. Finally, there is the democratic theory, which assumes a plurality of institutions, partly overlapping one another, and partly independent of one another. Any one institution, or form of association, may include several others, but no single one includes them all. This would be symbolized by a group of overlapping circles, some containing within themselves other circles, but no single circle embracing the whole cluster. Furthermore—what

cannot be indicated in the diagram—there is change, growth, and diminution, in the scope of any one institution in the course of the evolutionary process.

The exemplification of these theories in history should be plain enough. In the Middle Ages, we had a totalitarian church; in fascism and in communism we have a totalitarian state; and in the United States, for all practical purposes, we have had a totalitarian economic order. In each case, all other institutions have been made subordinate and ancillary to the dominant institution.

Absolute pluralism is illustrated either in radical nationalism, or in radical denominationalism. In this case, we have a collection of unique and sovereign entities, disavowing all fruitful relations with one another, each one arbitrary, self-sufficient, and complete in itself. The logic of radical nationalism was illustrated in the World War—although many persons have not yet read that far. The logic of radical denominationalism will, we trust, be frustrated by efforts at church unity.

As for the democratic theory, it should be—whether it is or not—exemplified in an ostensibly democratic country like the United States. In this case, neither church nor state would dominate one another, but both would have certain functions in common, and each would have certain unique functions.

The practical problem, obviously, is to define those areas in which church and state overlap, and also those areas which are unique to each; and, finally, to determine, in exactly what manner the one may act upon the other. Whether or not my own analysis, offered herewith, is adequate or correct may be open to discussion; but, at any rate, it is an effort in the right direction.

II

The overlapping areas of church and state can be easily indicated, and need not be elaborated at length here:

(1) Both include the same people. In fact, any individual belongs to a multitude of associations—his church, his nation, his family, his lodge, his business organization, and others. But it is absurd to make an inference from the identity of the individuals to the identity of the institutions which they serve.

(2) Both church and state are concerned with the moral welfare

of their members. The church has always had this concern. And the modern state, steadily evolving from *laissez-faire* to socialization, is increasingly recognizing its responsibility in this direction. No one can object to this overlapping. It is impossible to separate the political man from the religious man, and the economic man from the moral man.

(3) Both institutions use educational techniques. The Roman Catholic Church would repudiate this overlapping, but in Protestant countries we are disposed to accept it. We have public schools and denominational schools, and, for that matter, private schools. It is true that, in certain respects, church and state each has its unique methods of education, propaganda, and indoctrination. But in general they duplicate one another in this area.

III

The really crucial question is that of unique functions. I suggest that there are three important distinctions to be made here.

(1) The scope of the religious ideal is both higher and wider than that of the secular ideal.

What is indicated is a difference of scope and degree, rather than of kind. I am enough of a naturalist to believe that the spiritual has its roots in the natural, and that, however the spiritual may transcend the natural, that transcendence is of the order of naturalistic emergence. But I am also enough of a religionist to believe that this difference in degree is a supremely important one to civilization, and that it is not to be reduced to, or swallowed up in, lesser manifestations of the ideal.

It is a matter of common observation that many secular faiths approximate the Christian ideal. It is entirely understandable that there should be Christian communists and Christian anarchists. And so far as there is any identity of ideals, it seems to me that the church should gladly welcome these partners in the fellowship of aspiration. But it is also well known that these other groups, as political parties, often fall short of their own ideals in practice. This is illustrated in democracy as well as in communism. There is, first of all, the compromise with principles in order to get into power. And then there is the corruption of principles after power has been attained. The danger of a purely secular social gospel is evident at this point. Its initial

impulse is well justified; but, by identifying Christianity with a specific political program, it ends up, in practice, by impoverishing its ideal and by betraying the unique functions of Christianity.

The conclusion to be drawn is not that the church has no concern with practice. On the contrary, the church can well afford to be more thorough-going than it has been in the past, in making explicit the application of its principles to the contemporary scene. But it should always be borne in mind that the church is not seeking secular power. And it therefore has not the excuse of a political party for compromising with its principles. Let the church coöperate with any secular agency so far as it adheres to Christian ideals. But, when that secular agency begins to betray its principles, it is time for the church to stand aside and to criticize that agency in terms of the non-fulfillment even of its own ideals. Just as in the United States today, the church has the important function of reminding our government how far its democracy falls short of its own Christian principles, so may we at least imagine that, in some future state, the church may be called upon to remind a communistic government how far it falls short of realizing the Christian principles in communism.

Indeed, this function of maintaining a spiritual ideal of higher and wider scope is of supreme importance. History is full of the record of noble impulses which have perished too soon. And although the more meagre ideal always seems easier of fulfillment, there are at least two respects in which the larger ideal has a practical advantage: it gives us more light, enables us to see in clearer perspective the outlines of the program we are serving; it gives us more power—the increased dynamic that comes to any individual, or group, which feels that it is "getting in on a big thing."

(2) The method of Christianity is the method of inspiration, as against the method of legislation.

Here, of course, we touch upon a sore spot in American Protestantism. The omnicompetence of legislation to deal with all sorts of problems—moral, religious, political, economic—has been a sort of fetish with the American people. We have exhibited our reverence for this fetish by our great zest in both making and breaking images erected in its honor. And American Protestantism has been only too eager to follow in the wake of the state in this respect.

Now I am as ready as any one to recognize the superlative impor-

tance of certain kinds of social legislation as applied to our problems today. But it seems to me that the law is a political technique. Certainly it was clearly repudiated by Jesus and Paul as an instrument for effecting religious regeneration. The church can and should make evident the application of its principles to present issues, and, no doubt, in this connection, it may engage in discussion of the bearing of these principles on proposed or existing legislation. But when the church, as an official body, lends its support to any specific bit of legislation, it is not only trespassing upon the area of civic and political institutions, but is withdrawing its energies from the more important task which is uniquely its own.

That more important task, as Paul took pains to explain, is so to fill people with the spirit of the living Christ, that spontaneously and from their own inner impulses they will cherish and do the right, without being constrained either by custom or by law. The distinction here is the distinction made by Bergson between the "ethics of pressure" and the "ethics of aspiration." Let us grant that this task is a difficult one. Furthermore, the inadequacy of this technique of inspiration as operating upon our imperfect human nature may be legitimately supplemented, by the state, by political and legislative techniques. Indeed, it is quite intelligible that the individual, acting in his capacity as citizen rather than as church member, should work for such legislative supplements. But it can never be the business of the church to place its emphasis here. It may never excuse itself for its failure in its educational and inspirational function by pointing to its potency as a political lobby. It may not protest that, while it has been unable to make people love the good, it has nevertheless helped to pass laws to compel them to be good.

(3) The method of Christianity is the method of love, as against the method of violence.

A recent work which presents in dramatic form the challenge to Christian techniques of violence is Reinhold Niebuhr's *Moral Man and Immoral Society*. Here we have portrayed with clarity and vividness the pervasiveness of violence in the antagonisms of class, nation, and race. This lurid portrait is intended as a shock to the complacency of those philosophers who think that by mere "right reason," and of those religionists who think that by mere "good will," society can be easily changed.

But the conclusion to be drawn, it seems to me, is not that we should surrender intelligence and love, but that intelligence and love should become more genuinely sacrificial. Too often "right reason" and "good will" have been mere tools of rationalization, smugness, and sentimentalism. What Niebuhr's thesis serves to remind us of is that, in the use of these instruments, we must be at once more realistic and more heroic—ready, if need be, for martyrdom, not only at the hands of those whom we recognize as the enemy, but also at the hands of those whose ideals we may share but whose methods of violence we cannot condone. In brief, intelligence and love should be exemplified for us no longer by Pangloss and Pollyanna, but by Socrates and Christ.

For, at any rate, such intelligence and such love—fused as they are in religious ecstasy—cannot perish. It may be that violence, too, shall not perish from the earth. But we should have learned by now that the individuals and the institutions which employ violence must perish. But institutions, so far as they have genuinely practiced love, have lived on. As Moffatt's translation puts it so well: "Love never disappears. As for prophesying, it will be superseded; as for tongues, they will cease; as for knowledge, it will be superseded. . . . Thus faith and hope and love last on, these three, but the greatest of all is love."

Indeed, if the church can really make itself responsible that the spirit of love should "last on," it will be accomplishing no mean thing. For without love the new society is worthless. And history gives us good reason to believe that we cannot neglect love as an instrument and at the same time cherish it as an ideal; we cannot surrender love as a means, and hope to enjoy it as an end. Here, to be sure, means and end melt into one another; and, in sustaining the spirit of love, the church is at the same time following a Christian method and making possible a Christian aim.

IV

However, an elucidation of the overlapping and the unique functions of the church and of the state still leaves unsettled the problem of how the church is to act upon the state.

In terms of the democratic social philosophy which has been expounded in this essay, the action of any one institution upon another is primarily indirect—i.e., through the individual who may be a mem-

ber of both institutions. The individual is the medium of translation. The church may not act directly upon the state by means of political and legislative techniques. But it may so educate, influence, and inspire its membership that, when these members act in their capacity as citizens, they will be guided by Christian principles.

I am aware that many a realist will argue here that the church is impotent to accomplish anything by merely attempting to change attitudes when, in fact, the attitudes of its members are so largely moulded by the powerful secular influences outside the church. But, even granting this, it ought to be obvious that the church only weakens its influence when it surrenders its own unique methods for instrumentalities that are more effectively wielded by secular agencies.

Furthermore, if the mere changing of human attitudes has seemed to be without effect, then—let it be said plainly—that is because, either the change has been only a half-hearted one, or else it has not been attempted at all. To be specific, there are at least four factors which have rendered of no effect the changing of attitudes. One is metaphysical dualism, with its assumption that the implications of religious rebirth have a bearing only on the life to come in another world. Another factor is smugness, which means that change of attitude has been interpreted superficially, as being satisfied by the mere addition of an extra smirk of complacency about the mouth and twinkle of mischief in the eye. Yet another, and a more important, factor is romantic sentimentalism, which construes change of attitude as a mere change in the quality and tone of the way one feels, with a consequent neglect of intellectual content—i.e., the conversion to specific Christian principles, and the realization of their specific application to the social scene. Finally, the church has frittered away its energies with efforts at the legalistic and legislative reconstruction of morals and of society, and, to just that extent, has neglected the problem of changing attitudes. That American Protestantism should have so vitiated and so neglected the method of inspiration—this is its great betrayal, its great apostasy.

Just how powerful and far-reaching may be the indirect influence of one institution upon another, using the individual as the medium of translation, is clearly shown by the early history of Christianity. I believe it is impossible to find any explicit political doctrine in the teachings of Jesus. Also, if Paul had any political doctrine, it was of

the most safe and conservative sort. Yet the fact remains that, not only Jesus and Paul, but also Peter, were put to death, either with the consent of, or at the order of, Roman tribunals. And the frequent persecutions of Christians in the early centuries gives evidence that the political authorities of the time realized fully the subversive and revolutionary implications of this new religion. If, after awhile, Christianity did become safe and respectable, it was because it surrendered its unique functions, and consented to take over the functions and the aims of the Roman state.

However, we may permit of one exception to the rule that the action of the church upon the state must be indirect. This is in case the state should make an assault upon the very conditions and principles in virtue of which alone the church can exist. These basic conditions and principles may be summarized as the rights of freedom of speech, press, assemblage, and conscience. Without these rights there can be no church and no Christianity. When, and insofar as, these rights are encroached upon, it seems to me that the church, as an official body, may bring direct pressure to bear upon legislative assemblies, and even, to some extent, employ political techniques. But only when, and insofar as, these particular rights are impugned.

V

To some persons the foregoing analysis will seem over-rigid and dogmatic. Let it be conceded, then, that there must be some flexibility in our distinctions. We live in an evolutionary society, in which the scope and power of any institution varies with time and place. In the pioneer work of the mission field, the church may enlarge its functions almost without limit; in more complex and highly differentiated civilizations, it will have to restrict itself. Under a *laissez-faire* state, the church may extend its activities; under a socialized state, it must intensify its unique functions. Again, it may be natural to expect certain individual leaders and single churches to overstep the indicated boundaries, by way of compensating for others who make of religion an affair hygienically isolated from the contamination of social contacts. More than this, we must allow some leeway for growth and experimentation, in order that the boundaries of political and ecclesiastical functions may be freshly adjusted with changing situations.

But when all this is granted, it still remains important that there should be a central core of methods and ideals which is never surrendered. The higher and wider spiritual ideal, the method of inspiration, the method of love—here we have our common emphasis, our united front. When we desert these things in favor of other ideals and methods, or when we prostitute these things in the service of opposing ideals and methods, then we desert and we prostitute Christianity.

And in betraying Christianity we likewise betray the state. For it is the value of a system of democratically related institutions that we have the means of mutual stimulus and correction, of free and fruitful intercourse—a plurality of leverages for action, the possibility of variety, progress, and growth. Absolutism, whether of the totalitarian or pluralistic kind, means stultification, stagnation, and death.

Intrinsically, to be sure, there is no reason why one may not at the same time be a good patriot and a good Christian. There are many respects in which it is possible, simultaneously, to render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's. But there are occasions when it is necessary to choose between God and Caesar—between conscience and the Supreme Court, between discriminatory legislation and the sacredness of human personality, between armaments and love, between revolutionary violence and love, between the supremacy of spiritual treasures and the supremacy of material wealth. If so, then let us choose frankly and without equivocation. But, whatever be the choice, let us, at any rate, not indulge in that blasphemy against the Holy Spirit—the trimming and tailoring of our Christian heritage, so that it serves but as a cloak of sanctification for methods and purposes that are alien to it.

For ultimately the faithful Christian is the better patriot—better by far than the rabid nationalist. He may, with a good conscience, receive the saying, "My country, right or wrong." Surely one's country is always deserving of one's love and loyalty. But, if wrong, we shall not concur in its wrong; we shall not aid and abet its evil doing. Here true loyalty is shown by challenge and criticism in the light of a higher ideal. And one may die for his country even at the hands of his country. Only thus shall we bring the earthly city nearer to the heavenly city, which, as a promise, we have seen and greeted from afar, but into which we shall not enter except we take with us the flesh and blood, the bone and sinews, of our worldly abode.

COMMUNICATIONS

A REPORT OF THE THIRD OECUMENICAL THEOLOGICAL SEMINAR, GENEVA, JULY 28 TO AUGUST 15, 1936

THE third international seminar under the patronage of the Universal Christian Council and the Theological Faculty of the University of Geneva was held, as usual, under the able direction of Dr. Adolf Keller of the University of Geneva. The purpose of these seminars is "to support oecumenical work by theological examination of the problems of the oecumenical movement, to bring the students into contact with the essential character of the knowledge of the life and thought of other Churches, and finally to study special subjects connected with the oecumenical movement from the theological point of view." The seminar was inaugurated in the summer of 1934 with a three weeks' session in which eleven lecturers and thirty-five students from various countries and sects participated. In spite of adverse economic conditions all over the world the attendance in 1935 increased to eighty-five, coming from nineteen different countries. The international character of the seminar is illustrated by the fact that the lectures and discussions are conducted in English, French and German—and during the more heated discussion sometimes in all three at once!

The program of the 1936 seminar was designed with the special purpose of preparing the delegates who will attend the Church World Conferences in Oxford and Edinburgh in 1937. There was an attendance of ninety-nine, coming from Germany, Denmark, England, France, Holland, Iceland, Lithuania, Austria, Poland, Roumania, Scotland, Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the United States. The Lutheran, Reformed, United, Presbyterian, Anglican, Congregational, Old Catholic, and Orthodox Churches were represented. In the discussion the principal theological problems which are concerning the churches today were reflected, in particular the question of the totalitarian claim of the state, which will be one of the main problems discussed at the Oxford Conference next summer.

The program included courses and special lectures by leaders of

religious thought from the various churches. Among these were the following:

Prof. Paul Tillich, of Union Theological Seminary: The religious meaning of our historical existence. Problems and solutions in Europe and America.

Prof. Will, of Strasbourg: Essential types of Christian worship as seen from an oecumenical angle.

Prof. Vysheslavtsef, of the Russian Orthodox Seminary, Paris: Natural Theology and Theology of Revelation in the Orthodox Church.

Prof. Reinhold Niebuhr, of Union Theological Seminary: The Theory of the Natural and Christian Ethics.

Dr. Visser 't Hooft, of the World's Student Christian Federation: Missionary problems of the present day.

Dr. Hanns Lilje, of Berlin: Eschatology and history.

Dr. G. Thélin, of the International Labour Office: Contemporary social politics.

Professor Haitjema, of Groningen: The Problem: National Church-Free Church in Dutch Protestanism.

Dr. H. Schoenfeld, Director of the Research Dept. of the Universal Christian Council: Oecumenical work upon the problem of the state.

Prof. Martin Dibelius, of Heidelberg: (a) The Church and the World in the New Testament. (b) The hostility of the World against the Church.

Prof. Thurneysen, of Basle: Law and Gospel in the Sermon on the Mount.

Prof. Adolf Keller, of Geneva: Responsibility towards the Church and the Oecumenical Movement.

Dr. Kagawa, of Japan: The Christian social ethic in its particular application to industrial and economic needs.

Besides the intellectual value of the seminar in opening to the student vistas into the religious thought of other communions than his own, and contact with some of the finest minds of these communions, there is much that is stimulating in the very environment itself. In the hostels where the students live together there develops a sense of fellowship and sympathetic understanding which transcends the barriers of race and language. The young individualist from

America is forced to respect, however much he may disagree with it, the sincerity of the young Nazi from Germany. And also he has an opportunity to learn by human contact the essential difference between American and European Protestantism. The evening discussion meetings are especially valuable for bringing out differences in points of view. Each professor is given one evening in which his particular subject is brought into the open arena. These "free-for-all" informal meetings are often the very heart and center of a whole week's work. Perhaps the greatest moment of the seminar was the address of Dr. Kagawa which revealed the basic difference in the method of thinking between Orient and Occident, as well as the amazing similarity of problems.

BOOK REVIEWS

Religions of Mankind. By Otto Karrer. Translated by E. I. Watkin. New York: Sheed and Ward Inc., 1936. P. ix + 291. $3.00.

"For the Christian the act of faith reduces other religions to their relative and restricted truth and value. . . . The doctrinal content of Christianity . . . is the truth itself." (p. 198) "The absolute and exclusive claim of Christianity as opposed to a comparative superiority" (p. 199) can not be proved by the comparative method; faith alone can produce such a conviction. It is possible, none the less, thinks Dr. Karrer, to demonstrate through comparison that Christianity is supreme, because it is "a gospel which transcends all systems bound up with a special period, nation or culture, because it is open to every nation and every form of culture, but committed to none." (p. 216) The purpose of this book, therefore, is to prove that Christianity possesses the truth which all other religions are seeking. The major part of the work is taken up with the attempt to prove that mankind is really seeking the true God and is not merely engulfed in idolatry. To prove this is evidently difficult, but the author, by a generous use of condescending charity and by a judicious selection of texts and authorities, succeeds in convincing himself, and probably the reader, that mankind is sincerely religious, that all devout men are, in St. Augustine's words, "secret Christians." (p. 107) The important practical conclusion follows that although there can be no salvation outside the pale of the Catholic Church, there are no heathen, in the damnable sense, except those who "knowingly and deliberately" (p. 255) are outside the Church; those who are outside "from ignorance and in good faith" (p. 255) can be saved in virtue of the "universal revelation" which God has made of himself to all mankind. This is admittedly not new doctrine, but the author exhibits an unusual charity in believing most men to be ignorant and in good faith, rather than willful idolaters. For a Christian this is decidedly generous.

To demonstrate his thesis that there is an "uninterrupted Divine guidance of the entire human race" (p. 175) Dr. Karrer relies on several generalizations ostensibly derived from a survey of the history of religions, but really reiterated dogmatically, as if to assert Lewis Carroll's dictum, "What I tell you three times is true." Following

in general Schmidt's theory of the "original simplicity" of religion (*Uroffenbarung*), he tries to show that its distortion has taken place in two directions, one toward "anthropomorphisms, which on a lower level extend to the aberrations of sexual mysticism" (p. 174), the other toward rationalistic atheism and pantheism. Religion has thus not undergone a mere corruption, it has exhibited the extremes to which the human mind can be driven when left to itself. God's plan, so runs the author's myth, is to lead mankind back to the golden mean of ethical theism by keeping alive in all religions the essential core of true religion, and thus preparing mankind for the absolute revelation made through his only begotten Son.

As evidence of the "fall" from "primitive simplicity" Dr. Karrer relies on the myths that display the primitives' "homesickness for a condition they have lost." "It is more than probable," he adds with no good reason, "that such myths are reminiscences" (p. 134). He attempts to combine the magical, biological and causal bonds by which primitive man imagines himself tied to God, into a "total living experience" (p. 130) which gives man the awareness of his dependence on God. But above all, Dr. Karrer asserts, the belief in God comes through conscience, through a moral bond which alone reveals the true essence of all religion. He places considerable emphasis on this point. For example, after admitting that primitive man's mind is formed and dominated by his social environment, he hastens to add: "Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that education explains the origin of the conception of God. The notion of God can no more be explained by education, apart from an innate and natural disposition of the human spirit, than the notion of truth and falsehood, or of moral good and evil. Since an endless chain of human tradition is impossible, once in the past the spiritual spark of morality and religion must have been kindled in a first man without any parental teaching" (p. 115).

This conviction that the moral basis of religion can not be explained as a natural product of experience and education, is the central proposition on which Dr. Karrer's argument rests. He assumes, with little critical discussion, that man comes to a belief in God normally but not naturally. "Religion is an invasion from without, the illumination of man's consciousness, his mind and heart by an objectively existing divine Reality. . . . The religious life of humanity is therefore

founded upon a divine operation, upon God's enlightenment of the soul, upon a precedent communication from Him" (p. 15). On the basis of this theory Dr. Karrer concludes that the mysticism of the Orient is as supernatural as that of the Christians, and, in general, that what used to be called "natural religion" has always a core of revelation. To have this admission that the religious experience of pagans is like that of the Christians, inspired by the same God, is, to be sure, an advance over the more exclusive claims to revelation customarily made by Christians, but one wishes that a writer with the erudition of Dr. Karrer had at least considered seriously the other possibility, that Christian mystician may be as "natural" as pagan mysticism was supposed to be.

It is really difficult to understand how Dr. Karrer can believe all that he does, knowing as much as he does. One is startled, for example, after reading an elaborate critique of primitive religion to come upon the following: "In the light of this discussion *the Biblical account of man's religious origins* is seen to be the final explanation and synthesis of the scientific theories which we have considered." (p. 138) Admitting for the sake of argument that *Genesis* can be so interpreted as not to clash with the conclusions reached by scientists, the important issue is concerned less with the content of the conclusions than with the methods by which they have been reached. Is it reasonable to suppose that the author of *Genesis* had scientific information in the sense that his statements were based on the kind of evidence available to Dr. Karrer? If not, the author either believed a myth, "intuition" or "reminiscence" which was *later* proved *by science* to be true among countless others that proved to be false, or his uncanny insight came from supernatural revelation. In either case *Genesis* is not knowledge in the ordinary, scientific sense of the term. This is but one aspect of the fundamental difficulty which confronts such a position as Dr. Karrer's: how can one reconcile the general theory of deviation from an *original* revelation (because God for some mysterious reason chose to "leave the human mind to itself"), with the theory of an *evolving* revelation by which God is actively "preparing mankind for the absolute revelation?" The intuitive and the empirical conceptions of knowledge, the supernatural and the natural, are here not even verbally reconciled.

Without pausing, however, to question the accuracy of Dr. Karrer's

history of religion on particular points, I wish to consider his chief contention, namely, that Christianity alone is above the limitations of groups, nations and cultures, the gospel for all mankind. This hope for the religious unity of mankind independent of cultural diversity has been kindled among other religions as well. Islam and Buddhism, to mention only two outstanding faiths, claim a universality similar to Christianity's. Judaism claims universality but seldom asserts itself among Gentiles. To the Buddhist the Christian claim to cultural independence must seem as ill-founded as the Buddhist's does to the Christian. The Christian readily sees how Buddhism, despite the universality of its teaching, is really linked to the customs, beliefs, hopes, fears, and tastes of certain peoples. He sees readily how even within Buddhism cultural differences have effectively undermined the unity of the *dharma*. Is it asking too much that a Christian turn to see the similar cultural limitations of his own religion? Possibly Dr. Karrer would admit that the institutions of Christianity are determined by cultural patterns and insist merely that the Christian gospel is so universal that it can be adapted to any culture. But this is true of other gospels if it is true of Christianity. There is no intrinsic reason why the Baha'i, Mormon, or Taoist doctrines should not be held world-wide; whereas doctrines like those of Shinto, Nazism or Judaism are clearly linked to particular peoples for their exclusive use. The argument goes deeper, however. Dr. Karrer believes that the content of the Christian faith is so sublime and pure that it must impress the devout of every age and clime as the perfection of the true aim of every religion. He sums up this absoluteness of Christianity under four heads, as follows:

(A) The conception of God, the spiritual and living Father who out of love created the world, revealed Himself in His Son as Love in Person, and never ceases to offer His grace to a humanity banished from Him by sin.

(B) The corresponding conception of man made in the likeness of God, destined for communion with Him, even in sin still groping after Him in secret and united with Him by love.

(C) The positive valuation of men's moral disposition, his capacity to accept freely the inspirations of the All Holy and render them by faith and love efficacious for the supernatural perfection of his personality, and the establishment of a personal fellowship embracing all God's children, namely the *kingdom of God*.

(D) Whereas paganism strictly speaking knows no goal or purpose and can look forward to nothing but an endless circle or chain of phenomena, for Christianity the end for which all things exist is the glory of God in His creation and the bliss of that creation in the communion between God and humanity (p. 204).

I confess that for a Christian, accustomed to these ideas, it may be difficult to appreciate the difficulties that peoples of other cultures have in accepting what seems to him a pure, simple and universal gospel. But a little imagination and reflection ought to help him to see the cultural limitations even here. Is it easier for a devotee of Mother Kālī to turn to "the spiritual and living Father" than it would be for a Christian to say, "Our Mother who art in heaven"? Is it reasonable to expect the Buddhist to understand why God has a Son and why He sent him to a humanity which He himself had banished? Would the Australian tribesman recognize the value of the universal Kingdom of God? To say nothing of the mystery of the Trinity, which Dr. Karrer himself passes over too lightly. Are not these questions in order, if Christianity seriously intends to be free of cultural limitations, and is there any reason to believe that these fundamental concepts of Christianity can be made intelligible and appealing in every culture?

But I am less concerned with such difficulties than with the more basic question: Is it reasonable for a religion to seek such universality? Why should every knee bow to Christ? What would be gained for religion by ignoring cultural differences and limitations, even if this were possible? Would a single ark of salvation, catholic enough to take in all kinds and conditions of men, be genuinely comfortable for any? Is not a universal religion apart from a universal culture an absurd ideal? Is a religion like mathematics, a truth translatable into any language, or is it more like music, requiring common instruments and accustomed ears?

In short, I do not quarrel with Dr. Karrer for preferring his religion to others, for stating his preference openly and his reasons such as they are. A religious man ought to do what he has tried to do—compare his faith with that of others and defend it. But a student of comparative religion ought to be the last person to imagine that he defends his faith by confessing it, or by regarding it as the culmination of all others. "Christianity is 'the fulfilment of all religions,' not

only because it possesses in the pure state all religious values, but because it comprehends *in their utmost extent and fullness values elsewhere scattered and fragmentary.*" (p. 210) Faiths live in times and spaces. They are not neatly arranged on a single scale of value nor addressed to universal problems and ideals. A faith certainly has more human decency, to say nothing of piety, when it lives at home in peace and charity than when it strives for supremacy in world markets.

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The Dhammapada. Translated from the Pāli with an Essay on Buddha and the Occident. By IRVING BABBITT. New York: Oxford University Press, 1936. Pp. 121. $2.00.

Buddha was very critical; he had a sense of the flux and evanescence of all things and so of universal illusion keener by far than that of Anatole France; at the same time he had ethical standards even sterner than those of Dr. Johnson. This is a combination that the Occident has rarely seen and that it perhaps needs to see. At the very end of his life Buddha uttered words that deserve to be the Magna Charta of the true individualist: "Therefore, O Ananda, be ye lamps unto yourselves. Be ye refuges unto yourselves. Look to no outer refuge. Hold fast as a refuge unto the Law (*Dhamma*)." A man may safely go into himself if what he finds there is not, like Rousseau, his own emotions, but like Buddha, the law of righteousness. —(*Rousseau and Romanticism*, p. 370)

These words, written in 1919, may serve to remind us that Irving Babbitt's literary public has been long accustomed to his appreciation of Buddha. No critic can afford to overlook the fact that in the Oriental sage he finds august testimony to his own spiritual positivism, which testimony he advances in many a brilliant passage assailing the emotional naturalism of the modern world. Amid the swift-moving pageant of the references in his books, however, he nowhere shares with his readers the fullness of his thought concerning this particular attestation, though he included parts of the essay on "Buddha and the Occident" in his volume *On Being Creative and Other Essays*, published in 1932. Possibly this partially explains such misunderstandings as that of C. H. Herford who could write in his essay on "Romanticism in the Modern World" that we "hear across the trenchant invective of this doughty Harvard professor the wail of a Buddhist monk warning a world given up to agitating lusts that only in the eternal and immutable can rest be found."

What Mr. Babbitt really saw in the teaching of Buddha we are now in a position to know adequately from this attractive little volume posthumously published by Dora Babbitt. The fruit of arduous scholarly hours, it contains his version of a Pāli classic which in four hundred and twenty-three stanzas distils in aphoristic statement the essentials of early Buddhist doctrine. Also it contains his complete essay on "Buddha and the Occident," first written but not published in 1927. From these the evidence shines clear, and in beauty of language matching the rare depths of reflection, that the quality of excellence prized is not eternal and immutable rest but consummate activity of the higher will—in meditation, and an achievement of supreme psychological good—in serenity.

As to the translation, Professor Babbitt modestly refers to his work as a revision of the Max Müller version of the Dhammapada in the Sacred Books of the East. Examination shows, indeed, far less divergence from Müller's basic sentences than is the case in the independent translation by Wagiswara and Saunders and than must necessarily be the case in the English verse rendering by F. L. Woodward. Yet by bringing a later understanding of the Pāli text in the light of more recent scholarship, and by adding the sensitive touch of the literary artist Professor Babbitt has made two valuable contributions. He has here and there sharpened the focus of meaning in Müller's phrases; e.g. "garland weaver" is more definite than "clever man" in Stanza 44, "sacrificial fire" more immediately significant than "Agni" in Stanza 104, and "the householder's life is difficult and burdensome" more understandable than "painful are the houses" in Stanza 302. Moreover, he has smoothed away the jagged edges of Müller's often rough-hewn constructions. One example must suffice. For Stanza 377 Müller wrote "As the Vassika plant sheds its withered flowers, men should shed passion and hatred, O ye Bhikshus." This is plain and direct but the reader may judge whether it invites lingering reflection as do the euphonious words of Dr. Babbitt, "As the jasmine sheds its withered flowers, even so, O monks, men should shed lust and hatred." In this semi-poetic quality of his rendering Dr. Babbitt cleaves closer to the lyric tradition of great Buddhistic literature in which, at its best, insight seeks utterance in language akin to music. Great translators, such as Kumārajiva in China, have always respected this. For this reason the new version of the Dhammapada will open it as a new book to a wider circle of those for whom Eastern wisdom

seems for the most part remote and unprofitable. At any rate, we have here both authenticity and charm, and he who runs may read.

It is not necessary to discuss the content of the Dhammapada in order to estimate its meaning for Babbitt the thinker. In the essay on "Buddha and the Occident," forming the second half of the volume, we are shown how profitably he can discuss modern problems from the angle of a knowledge of the essence of Buddhism. If in our time material contacts between national and racial groups increase, it is disastrous if they remain spiritually alien. The fact itself is patent and not infrequently remarked. It is also a commonplace that in some sense the East stands for inwardness and the West for external achievement. What Dr. Babbitt discerns in this connection, however, is that in the authentic teaching of Buddha the typically Eastern emphasis on truths of the inner life is found free from casuistry, obscurantism and intolerance. This is as valuable for the West to know in addition to its pursuit of truths of the natural order as it is tragic for the East to forget in acquiring the machinery of scientific efficiency. Yet the total spirit of Buddha is not easy to grasp. It cuts across established oppositions of Western thought. Doctrinally akin to Heraclitus and Bergson in his view of universal transcience, he aims at a type of life which seems to us Platonist and Christian in its feeling for transcendence. In temper positivistic, he is in his respect for a higher Law (*Dhamma*), both in and beyond human nature, supernaturalistic. Stoical in the severity of his self-control, he is unstoical in his rejection of theoretical reason and his refusal to "accept the universe." He seeks to unify life, but not like Hegel in terms of intellect, nor like Rousseau in terms of feeling; rather, it is by the assertion of a special quality of will—the "will revealed above all in the act of attention and concentration" (p. 86). Here he agrees with St. Augustine and William James when they treat of the will psychologically. In contrast to Christian devotion, however, his concentration of will centers neither upon a divine will nor upon a saviour, but upon an impersonal Law.

This statement of Buddha's meaning—too undeveloped in this limited review—cannot represent the later Mahāyāna Buddhism, as Professor Babbitt himself recognizes. This latter presents the ethical teachings in a greatly changed doctrinal perspective, with elements more akin to Western metaphysics and the Christian doctrine of grace.

Any assessment of the total significance of Buddhism for the Orient, and so for East-West relations generally, cannot omit consideration of such transformations. It is characteristic of the author here as elsewhere, however, that he seeks primarily in Eastern wisdom not confirmation of Western characteristics but counter-balance to their exaggeration. For his purpose, Buddha's original thought, so far as we may reach it in early literature, is the more appropriate norm. In him is found just that contrast between the expansive desires, so typical of the Occident, and the will to refrain, in which—let modern happenings attest—it is now ominously deficient. His choice of values is not in doubt. He taught a spiritual strenuousness (appamāda) as a higher activity of the human will than an exhausting assiduity in the fulfillment of a host of conflicting material desires.

For the general reader Professor Babbitt's discussion flows the more attractively for its many allusions to well-known literature. Buddha's goal of emancipation, he notes, is free from the nostalgic yearning for the perfected humanitarian hope of Wordsworth and Tennyson. The meditative tranquillity involved is something far more vitally active than the sleepy indifference which Mr. Chesterton ascribes to Buddhist saints. In its freedom from emotion it renders infelicitous Matthew Arnold's famous definition of religion, and negatives Schopenhauer's mistaken attempt to associate Buddha with an ethics of sub-rational sympathy. There is mysticism as in Neo-Platonism, but with a difference. Neo-Platonic influence has tended toward monism, pantheism and ethical indiscrimination, whether in Hegel, Croce, Novalis or Walt Whitman. Buddha's mysticism, on the other hand is dualistic, sharply separating the achievement of the perfected will from the whole illusion of the phenomenal world. While the professional philosopher is not likely to accept such comparisons forthwith without qualification their presence adds greatly to the vivacity and stimulating power of the essay.

What is the final outcome? Professor Babbitt does not conceal the fact that such acid discounting of our expansive desires as is here implied cuts athwart both the utilitarianism and the sentimentalism of modern acquisitive life. It certainly shrivels complacency in self-assertiveness and aggression. Yet in view of what modern will-to-power has done both in the Great War and after, it cannot well be denied that the suggestion of a new emphasis on some art of discipline

for the inner life of the individual is profoundly pertinent. There are disquieting signs that the West tends to forget the higher values it once was taught. Now that we have this new translation of the Dhammapada along with his last, illuminating Essay we can see that Irving Babbitt has acted on his conviction that "a collateral benefit of any comprehension one may achieve of Buddha is that it will help one to a better understanding of Christ" (p. 115). These words are not meant to recommend conventional Christianity or to slur over differences of outlook between Christ and Buddha. The Christ of conventional modern Christianity tends to be a "humanitarian phantom," while in intellectual conception the gap between Christ and Buddha is wide. But psychologically, and this is what his words have in view, both religious teachers have recognized in man a capacity which if exercised carries him to the realization of values more excellent and more profound. It is a principle of control in human nature, obscured, Mr. Babbitt thinks, in naturalistic psychologies, but a factor of overwhelming importance, unless the testimony of religious leaders is dismissed altogether. Dante, Milton, Goethe and the Stoics all seem to have recognized something of it in their emphasis on will and self-control. More precisely it is for our author the "higher" or "transcendent" will, and its secret, in the last analysis, is discovered in the art of meditation which, since it is not further analysed, we presume is to be learned by each individual for himself.

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The Christianity of Ignatius of Antioch. By Cyril Charles Richardson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1935. Pp. x + 120. $2.00.

The interpretation of the letters of Ignatius and the relation between his thought and that of the first century church have been so generally neglected that this fresh study of these problems is very welcome.

Professor Richardson offers here a careful, compact, well-documented, acute, and balanced analysis of some of the principal words in the theological vocabulary of Ignatius and thereupon considers his acquaintance with and dependence upon the writings of Paul and John. The 114 notes constitute a *multum in parvo*. If some Christian

theologians perused notes 21, 23, 99 they would begin the rewriting of several chapters in their lecture notes before cock-crow. The idea of substitutionary sacrifice first appears in Justin's "Dialogue with Trypho" chapter 40 in an erroneous analogy between Christ and the goat destined for Azazel. Dependence of Ignatius upon Paul is demonstrated for I Corinthians. Doubt survives in case of the remaining Pauline correspondence even where the authors of the "New Testament in the Apostolic Fathers" are rather convinced. In regard to the Johannine literature, the final verdict reads, "indebtedness to John not yet indubitably established," although both Ignatius and John interpret the eucharist in the same unique way.

The Ignatian terms considered are faith, agape, life, unity, God, Spirit, heresy, and the eucharist. The unity desired by Ignatius was obedience to ecclesiastical authorities. The rather nebulous "Judaistic docetism" of earlier investigation is happily replaced with the hypothesis of two distinct heresies. The eucharistic rite is basically related to the unity of the church but does not determine the conferment of life and love.

Ephesians 12:2, "Paul . . . who in every letter mentions you in Jesus Christ," is subjected to drastic criticism with the result that it should no longer be so carelessly used to establish the existence of a canon of Pauline letters for Ignatius. At least in as much as there is no express reference to Ephesian Christians in general in any genuine letter of Paul, the Ignatian Pauline list must have been very different from the existing New Testament list!

The author pertinently points out that the expression, kingdom of God, occurs only in Ephesians 16 and Philadelphians 3 and has eschatological, not social, reference.

In view of the great current interest attaching to the definition of church in early Christianity, it is to be regretted that the Ignatian idea of the church was not included in this analysis. Olof Linton's *Das Problem der Urkirche in der neueren Forschung* hints at important connections between Ignatius and the previous century. The employment of *agape* for love, although defendable, is nevertheless confusing. The avoidance of the title *Savior* and its infrequent use in early Christian documents might have been further explained by the fact that *theos-soter* was a fixed compound at that time and therefore Savior could not very well be applied to Jesus before he became *theos*.

The treatment of the development of New Testament Christology is too abbreviated and Bousset and Heitmueller have certainly made out a case for the origin of "Lord," as applied to Christ, in the cultus of the Hellenistic Christian churches. Since Paul identifies the Lord with the Spirit in II Corinthians 3:17 and according to Romans 8:11, the Spirit dwells in the Christian and Christ also does, must the Lord dwell apart? Leisegang's *Der Heilige Geist* is very revealing at this point.

An almost perfectly printed book has *Septaugint* on page 16 and *mataphors* on page 64.

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Adversus Judaeos. A Bird's-Eye View of Christian Apologiae Until the Renaissance. By A. Lukyn Williams. Cambridge: at the University Press; New York: the Macmillan Co., 1935. Pp. xvii + 428. $9.00.

Ever since a group of Palestinian Jews accepted Jesus of Nazareth as the divinely begotten Messiah, and formed a religious community apart from the Jews who denied his divinity, the intellectual leaders of Christendom—preachers, exegetes, theologians and ecclesiastics—have composed treatises to expose the blindness and obstinacy of the Jews, and to show from the prophecies of the Old Testament (the Old Covenant, in Paul's language) that the new faith had supplanted the old as the way of salvation.

Each of these treatises not only reflects the author's peculiar beliefs and temperament, but, more significantly, illustrates to some extent the general state of theological learning and the conditions of the author's time, as well as the political and cultural state of his Jewish contemporaries, and the degree of success or failure of the author's predecessors in overcoming Jewish objections to the claims of the New Testament and its expounders. It is, therefore, obvious that a survey of this literature is likely to be of great importance for the understanding not only of Christian psychology and the history of Christian-Jewish relations, but also of the broader sociological problem of how a majority rationalizes its prejudices against a minority.

Such a survey has been undertaken by Dr. Williams, the learned Canon of Ely, who in several earlier works had dealt with the prob-

lems of Christianity's relation to Judaism. By virtue of his great biblical scholarship and his wide knowledge of patristic and rabbinic literature, as well as his scrupulous fairness and sympathy with the minority, Dr. Williams is admirably qualified to write on this subject, and he *has* written admirably. His purpose in outlining the history of Christian polemics against Jews and Judaism is to indicate briefly the nature of these treatises and to explain the circumstances which called them forth, and also to suggest reasons why they had such little success as instruments of missionary endeavor on the part of the church. Though the book deals only with "such treatises as were written from the first century of our era to the beginning of the Renaissance, and are available in print," it is not likely that anything of importance has been overlooked in the whole of Christian apologetic literature dealing with Jews.

Dr. Williams has found it convenient to divide these treatises into five groups: the Ante-Nicene Fathers; the Syriac writers; Greek writers 325-1455 A.D.; Spanish writers; Latin writers 384-1349 A.D. Each group contains some eminent names: the first, Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Hippolytus, Cyprian, Origen; the second, Aphrahat, Dionysius Bar Salibi; the third, Chrysostom, St. John of Damascus; the fourth, Prudentius, Isidore of Seville, Peter Alphonsi, Raymund Martini, Raymund Lull; the last, Augustine, Agobard, Peter Damiani, Peter the Venerable, Peter of Blois, and Nicolas de Lyra. And yet it is surprising to see how many of these and the other writers discussed had, according to Dr. Williams, very little knowledge of Hebrew literature, Judaism, or Jewish ways and beliefs. Among the fifty or so treated one finds this to be true of Pseudo-Gregory of Nyssa, the author of the Dialogue of Papiscus and Philo, Chrysostom, Andronicus of Constantinople, Prudentius, Isidore of Seville, Hildefonsus of Toledo, Alphonso de Spina, Evagrius, Augustine, Pseudo-Augustine, Agobard (though his ignorance is qualified), Peter Damiani and Peter of Blois. In the case of most of these, and several others, who were more learned, Dr. Williams is forced to observe regretfully that their failure to understand the theology and ethics of Judaism was no less marked than their failure to understand Christianity and the spirit of human kindness. At the same time he believes that many others of these Christian apologists may be judged, in the light of their own day, to have had a spiritual insight which may still serve

as an inspiration to modern Christians, even if it does not furnish them with practical aid in missionary activities among Jews.

The earliest Greek and Latin writers confined themselves largely to adducing proof texts from the Old Testament (naturally in the Septuagint or Vulgate versions) and attempting to convince the Jews, by an exegesis no less fanciful than that used by the rabbis in their Haggadic Midrash or homiletical exposition of Scripture, that certain passages in Isaiah, the Psalms, Daniel, the Wisdom of Solomon, the Song of Songs, etc., unmistakably refer to the life and teachings of the Christian Messiah, and thus confirm the statements of New Testament writers that Jewish prophecy has been fulfilled in Jesus Christ. Dr. Williams makes it seem probable that there were in circulation in the early centuries Books of Testimonies which served as works of reference for Christian scholars who were engaged in controversies over Scripture with Jews, and needed appropriate verses to quote. Although, as might be expected, their Jewish opponents for the most part declined to accept either the Christian's translation of Scripture or his mystical exegesis, this form of argument continued to be the most important part of apologetic writings down to the end of the period covered in this volume. But as time went on, and the Church as a political institution had to deal with the social problems incident to the anomalous status of the Jews in Europe and their relation to the secular power, ecclesiastical writers began to draw upon later Jewish works such as Midrash and Talmud, for material to support their contention that the Jews were an ungrateful, pernicious, obstinate, superstitious, idolatrous and avaricious nation, given to desecrating the Host and comitting ritual murders. It was especially in Spain from the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries that anti-Jewish animus was most brutally expressed in the polemic literature; and the Jewish historian is compelled to note with sorrow that the most vindictive and dangerous, and at the same time most learned, adversaries of the Jews were Jewish converts to Christianity, such as Peter Alphonsi (Moses of Huesca), Paulus Christiani, Geronimo de Santa Fe (Joshua ibn Vives al-Lorqui) and Paul of Burgos (Solomon ha-Levi), who reached high positions in the Church largely through their zeal in attacking their former coreligionists.

If space permitted, it would be instructive to quote some of Dr. William's many interesting and often illuminating comments on the

separate treatises he has summarized—on the problems of date, sources, authorship and background. We must content ourselves with a few quotations illustrating his treatment of the different personalities and forms of argument presented. (P. 90) "Of all the early writers on the relations of Judaism and Christianity, Origen is the one who approaches most nearly to our own times in his sense of values . . . he seizes on moral aspects both in the case of our Lord and that of believers, as few writers do." (P. 102, of the Syrian Father Aphrahat) "Also he seems to have felt very strongly that some of his people were exposed to the danger of being led astray by Jewish practices and even Jewish arguments" (the same fear was later expressed by ecclesiastics in Visigothic Spain and Carolingian France). (P. 113, summarizing the Syriac writers) "In any case the failure of the Syriac-speaking Church to do its utmost to win Jews to Christ prevented the influx of Jewish energy into its ranks and may thus have contributed to the spiritual torpor into which it gradually fell." (P. 132) "Chrysostom's *Homilies Against the Jews* are glorious reading for those who love eloquence and zeal untempered by knowledge. . . . Far more serious still than his ignorance is his lack of a real evangelistic spirit in his relation to them (the Jews). There is no sign that he felt the slightest sympathy with them." (P. 157, on the *Teaching of Jacob*) "(It) portrays the experience of Jews who had been baptised by force, with the natural abhorrence of Christianity felt by most of them, and also the desire of some of them to understand it." (P. 321, of Augustine) "He is, therefore, properly speaking, not attempting to win Jews directly to Christ, although his arguments why they should believe on Him, are such as Augustine himself would use. . . . For Christian people have duties towards Jews, and must do their best to lead them to Christ. . . . Chrysostom, when he thought of Jews, was the ecclesiastic; Augustine was the Christian." (P. 366, quoting Peter Damiani who wrote a treatise against the Jews to oblige a friend, although he would have preferred to denounce the vices of the age) "For these enemies are always with us, while Jews have now (eleventh century) almost ceased to exist." (P. 385 of Peter the Venerable of Cluny, who begins his address to the Jews in very uncomplimentary terms) "It is not a very tactful opening for a treatise designed to win Jews over to the Faith! But it is only rarely that Christian writers have regarded Jews otherwise than from a level presupposed to be immeasurably

higher than the Jewish, and have been able to keep out of sight their conviction that the unbelief of Jews was due to sheer obstinacy. Christian writers often lacked the knowledge, and too often even the love, which would have made their zeal effective." (P. 390, on Peter's use of Talmudic legends about God's controversy with certain rabbis over points of Jewish law) "May it not be the case, in other words, that Peter the Venerable represents the crasser Western mind, which does not possess the wit or the imagination of the Oriental? Jewish 'fables' are often not so insane as the first impression of them suggest."

It is not only the student of Christianity or Judaism who will profit from reading this volume, for it throws interesting side-lights on the influence of some of these apologetic treatises on the medieval drama, on Church art, and on various historical matters. But though the volume may be read with profit, very few students, unfortunately, will be able to buy it for themselves. The reviewer sincerely hopes that the publishers will receive so many requests for a reduction in price that they will offer it for half its present one.

RALPH MARCUS

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Adolf von Harnack. By AGNES VON ZAHN-HARNACK. Berlin: Hans Bott Verlag, 1936. Pp. 570. RM 7.50.

Multitudes of students sat at the feet of the great teacher Adolf von Harnack in Berlin, whose extraordinary personality and astounding erudition charmed his auditors. Seated upon his desk in absolute freedom and wholly independent of any manuscript, he developed in his discourses involved trends of thought in perfect plasticity and clarity. One could hardly decide which was the more astounding: the enormous range of his knowledge, which was at all times at the command of his unfailing memory; or the constructive power of his organizing mind, which enabled him to build up in huge blocks and seemingly without effort great systems of thought; or his scholarly imagination, which for the mastery of materials invented ingenious theses and yet was always curbed by a meticulous care of detail; or the talent for organization manifested by him in the supervision of the library of the University, in the Academy of Sciences, and in directing the *Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft.* Here is a life-work regarding which one may well ask who is able to review and to evaluate it.

His daughter, Agnes von Zahn-Harnack, has dared to undertake it, and with signal success. May others delve still more deeply and bring new material to light, more grandly overarch the total scope of his life and labors, and perhaps, after many years, say the definite word that shall assign to this great interpreter of Christian history his rightful place. We have here an initial structure into which a well-informed biographer has garnered the sifted and unified harvest of a great life—a volume which all students and friends of Harnack everywhere will receive with deepest gratitude.

This achievement of an octogenarian is, of itself and viewed as a life task, a problem. Her power of application, her control of a vast intellectual field, together with her ability to give form and order, is an astonishing phenomenon, and yet it is made up of thoroughly human qualities and achievements united in harmonious action by an incredibly propitious fate.

Harnack's life was strictly that of a scholar. He is typical of the nineteenth century scholar. But as a scholar he had keenness of imagination which could gather up in one scientific view minutest discoveries, grammatical peculiarities, omissions, and qualities of style. I still marvel at what, in his Berlin seminar, his power of vision, combining severest exactness with wide range, was able to make of the Muratorian Fragment, the first listing of books of the New Testament.

Harnack's active life was spent at the universities of Leipzig, Giessen, Marburg, and Berlin. His call to Berlin met with serious opposition, not only in ecclesiastical, but also in political circles. It was effected by Bismarck and Emperor Wilhelm in opposition to the Supreme Church Council (*Oberkirchenrat*), who feared that the church would be endangered by Harnack's criticism of Christian literature. Bismarck received the honorary degree of doctor of divinity in recognition of his support of this scholar, who soon became a credit to the University. Harnack's lectures and seminars were veritable ecumenical institutions in which scholars from all parts of the world met. Little wonder that Harvard University offered him a professorship at a time when academic freedom seemed to be endangered in Germany.

Harnack's diligence and capacity for work were stupendous. A published bibliography of his works listed over fifteen hundred. Much of his work in church history and the history of dogmas is normative. In

his research he accepted as a sacred task his obligation to whatever truth he discovered. Hence his repeated serious conflicts with conservative ecclesiastical circles. One of these conflicts centered about the Apostles' Creed. It was the precursor of the present creedal conflict. That Harnack recognized the necessity of such a conflict is clear from his defense of the *Spruch-Kollegium*. But the creedal boundaries of the church must not become adulteration of accepted truth or curtailment of the freedom of conscience. Harnack advised that there be liberty in the use of the Apostles' Creed, but that another creed be placed alongside it, in which are combined fidelity to the historic Christian message and the theological knowledge and piety of the new generation. He met with an exceedingly strong opposition—"the rabble of little malicious ranters, pious perverters of truth, and unholy naïveté." The *Kultusministerium* shielded him.

The publication of his *Das Wesen des Christentums* gave rise to another serious conflict. In this he greatly simplified the evangelical message, reducing it to the relationship of God and the soul; the later dogma of the mediatorial office of Christ he could not discover in the message of Jesus. In the deductions he makes here we have perhaps the boldest expression of the reductive historicism of the nineteenth century. Harnack was also in the thick of the *Babel und Bibel* conflict, of the conflict concerning the value of the history of religion, and of the conflict concerning the later attitude to Catholicism. His last conflict arose when with the publication of Karl Barth's *Roemerbrief* dialectical theology cast a flaming fagot into the lofty structure of nineteenth century historicism.

In that conflict the boundary lines of the theological generations and of the centuries became evident. To Harnack the concern of dialectical theology remained a closed book. In view of the many conflicts Harnack had to engage in, a word may be permitted regarding the nature of the polemic. There is a polemic, at home, too, in many parts of Switzerland, which subscribes to the slogan: "Give the dog a bad name and hang it." That is to say, in this polemic the opponent is held to misinterpretation of a statement of his, or an importance is attached to a statement of his which it never had for him. He is apprehended for the critical attack and misrepresented, in order the more easily to defeat him. Because he suffered much from this kind

of unfair polemic, Harnack was prompted to write the following significant words: "Beginning with about the fourth or fifth century, unalloyed truth has not been regnant in the church. At all times more was confessed than could be confirmed."

Harnack's scholarship was not confined to his study, it sought an outlet. Hence he became one of the great organizers of German science. As organizer and president of the *Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft* he introduced in Germany the American idea and experience of the great research institutes, which segregate independent research from the instructional work of the university in order to promote the application of scientific knowledge to technology. That brought Harnack into closer relationship with the Emperor and the government, and this led to much unkind criticism. In a letter to Harnack Wellhausen made what was probably a just statement: "You have a gift for getting along with those in high station without sacrificing principle. That demands not only a knack, but also courage; and courage you have, unobserved by men."

At heart Harnack remained a theologian. He was a theologian of the nineteenth century, in which much found a place that present-day theology rejects—an optimistic confidence in man, too close a connection with the pure sciences, an esthetic enjoyment of art and poetry. For these Harnack had an unusually fine sense of appreciation. Even in the closing years of his life he might be heard in a circle of friends reciting selections from Goethe with unfailing memory. Moreover, he was an ardent and simple Christian, unencumbered by his erudition and vitally interested in the practical application of the Gospel to the social problems of his day. For years he was the president of the Evangelical Social Congress (*Evangelisch-Sozialer Kongress*). True, irrespective of the theological trend of the nineteenth century, he could not in his personal religion disregard what he had learned from history. His theological structure he based, as he believed, on Calvin, Luther, and Ritschl, "on belief in Christ, trust and peace in God, humility, work, and calling." In opposition to the latitudinarian history of religion he held that the Christian religion is not merely *a* religion among many, but that it is "*the* religion."

Even at that time he opposed the union of religion and politics, but advocated a new and closer union and coöperation of the churches. He

would not listen to the merging of the consistories, which would have required the relinquishment of their own possessions; but he warmly welcomed the ecumenical movements and was closely connected with the leaders, especially with Söderblom. The reviewer is glad at this time to pay a debt of gratitude to Harnack, for it was on a motion made by this revered teacher that he was entrusted with the direction of the International Socio-Scientific Institute, a fruit of the Stockholm conference. His ecumenical friend, Söderblom, perhaps most aptly characterized the scholarly life of Harnack, when he wrote that for him science was "a lofty form of life, and not merely a way to results."

His theological age had to feel the ingratitude and opposition of a new generation which he no longer understood. Harnack never gave up the union of religion and culture which was attacked by dialectical theology. Barth, it is true, speaking for dialectical polemic, admitted "that an ambiguous pathos of absoluteness and contradiction is almost unavoidable, when in theology a serious interest must be plead that was neglected by the former generation." But in spite of this admission his failure to get a favorable response from the young generation grieved Harnack deeply.

The world war was a hard blow for Harnack, especially England's declaration of war. For in England and America he had a host of friends. Harnack abetted the uprising of his nation, but not without criticism, e.g., he had edited the Emperor's proclamation to his people (*"An mein Volk"*) and had also signed the declaration of the ninety-three; but his standing criticism of the ensuing policies shows the high degree of independent judgment he maintained even in the midst of the war.

Harnack's many students have been waiting impatiently for this first presentation of his life and labors. A deep personal understanding of Harnack could be expected of a daughter of his. Nevertheless, her signal success in this first perspective of his scientific life-work is astounding and merits deepest gratitude. The volume appears at a time when remembrance of Harnack is still alive, and when the search has already begun for the place which the sum total of his life-work will occupy in the intellectual history of the nineteenth century.

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From Dyad to Triad. By Alexis van der Mensbrugghe. London: The Faith Press, 1935. Pp. xxi + 153. 7/6.

It is very hard to comment upon this book, and for the Western mind it is still harder to understand it, for the author has set himself for perhaps the first time the task of explaining the theory of the Divine Wisdom (St. Sophia) in terms of Western philosophical development. This is certainly a far reaching task, and it will require long and careful study before the point of view which he has adopted can be either accepted or rejected.

We have long known of the Divine Wisdom. She (It) figures in the early writings of the Church Fathers. She (It) has given her (its) name to the most famous church in Christendom, the Church of St. Sophia in Constantinople. There has been on the one hand a feeling, especially in the West, that this concept came from a desire to graft the cult of Pallas Athena on Christianity, and it seems a fact that for a time the Parthenon at Athens was a Church dedicated to the Divine Wisdom. On the other hand, it is equally certain that not all of the references to the Divine Wisdom can be accepted as mere religious syncretism.

When we go back to the account of the creation in the first chapter of Genesis, we are told that the spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters. The word "spirit" is here feminine and there has been a long-continued discussion as to whether or not this was a prefiguration of the Holy Trinity and whether the Spirit of God was here the Holy Spirit, as it is treated by most confirmed Trinitarian thinkers. Fr. van der Mensbrugghe, himself a Trinitarian, denies this and sees in this feminine spirit the Divine Wisdom.

There are also a large number of thinkers, some not distinctively Christian, as Merezhkovsky, who seek the feminine principle in deity with the hope of identifying a holy Family, Father, Mother, and Son, and for this end the Spirit of the Trinity is made feminine. Fr. van der Mensbrugghe is opposed to this also, for again the feminine member becomes the Divine Wisdom, associated with, but not part of, the Holy Trinity.

So much for preliminary discussions. One more remark must be made. Orthodox theology after the fall of Constantinople showed a marked tendency to accept Western and Roman Catholic elements which reached its height in the Kiev school of the seventeenth century

under the great Archbishop Peter Mogila. The tendency has now changed, and under the leadership of the Russian Theological Academy at Paris, there is a constant tendency for Orthodox and specifically Russian Orthodox ideas to enter Western thought. Fr. van der Mensbrugghe as a former monk of Amay, and now an Orthodox, is perhaps the first who has plunged headlong into the sea of Sophianism and this work is the first product of his thought.

The philosophical basis is the idea common to Orthodoxy that the way to attain the truth is not by the Scholastic system of securing definite answers which can be expressed as alternatives, yes or no, but that there must be a sense of wholeness which can only be attained by the balancing of contradictory ideas in a higher synthesis. Perhaps we are not distorting the ideas of the writer if we see in this higher synthesis the direct activity or embodiment of the Divine Wisdom.

Then like the Orthodox generally he retains in his view all things that exist in the past, present, or future, and he seeks to secure a synthesis that will embrace all the facts of revealed and observed data. He does this through emphasizing the dual as contrasted with the dualistic, and thus he secures the dyad where the two elements are bound together firmly, and where a higher synthesis can blend the conflicting truths that are in them. He bases much of his argument on a definition of analogy whereby there can be vertical and horizontal analogy (the former where one member is superior to the other in quality, the other where the two members differ in quantity). With these principles, he discusses the dyad in ontology, "economic" theology and axiology (using the terms in the Russian sense) and reviews carefully the Christological and Trinitarian controversies in the ancient Church.

Here he endeavors to point out that it is possible through an understanding of the principle of the Divine Wisdom to put the question in such a way that the two problems of the relations of the Persons of the Blessed Trinity, and the Incarnation and the Creation, can be brought together into one consistent whole. He illustrates these points with reproductions of old Russian ikons and argues with Western philosophical means.

In the course of this he points out that there are many similarities between the Western attitude toward the Blessed Virgin and the Eastern attitude toward the Divine Wisdom and there seems to be

in one phase of the argument a definite identification of the Divine Wisdom and the Blessed Virgin, the one involved in the manifestation of the Second Person of the Trinity in the Godhead, the other in the Incarnation on earth of Jesus Christ.

This book speaks a language which is very alien to Western modes of thought (both Roman Catholic and Protestant), but it is based on the teachings of the early Fathers, and is, as we have noted, greatly influenced by the modern school of Russian Orthodox thinkers. It is for only a half century that these theologians have been developing the teachings as to the Divine Wisdom, and their ideas are not yet accepted throughout the entire Orthodox world. Nevertheless, their point of view is striking and with the great changes that are taking place today in scientific and philosophic thought it is well worth considering, and this book deserves the careful attention of all those who are interested in problems of theology and in philosophies which seek an explanation of the meaning of the universe.

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The Orthodox Church. By SERGIUS BULGAKOV. Milwaukee: Morehouse Publishing Co., 1936. Pp. 224. $3.50.

To those persons, and they still are numerous, who believe that the Orthodox Church is a dead and fossilized institution, this work of Father Bulgakov will come as a surprise and perhaps a shock, for the learned and pious author sets out an ideal of Orthodoxy that is remarkably alive and vital. It is a striking product of the Russian Orthodox Theological Seminary at Paris, and this institution is today one of the most active centres for theological thought in the world, and even if the objection is made that these men are but a group of emigrés, yet the world will be forced to take notice of their ideas and their studies.

As a matter of fact, it is probably true that the ideas of Orthodoxy here set forth would be strange to a majority of the members of the Orthodox Church. There is no need to be surprised at this, for we can judge the theology and the ideas of no church by the bridge-table or the washtub, and it is unfortunately true that far too many of the Orthodox had come to consider their Church like their government, as something unchangeable, handed down to them from the generations.

There were many causes for this, but at no time was it the whole truth.

Especially during the last century in Russia there was a long list of eminent thinkers and theologians who reconsidered the entire teachings of the Church. They did this, not with the idea of creating a new religion, but seeking to revaluate many of the ideas that had penetrated the Eastern Church from Roman Catholic sources, and they went back and studied the developments of Orthodox theology throughout the whole period of the Byzantine Empire and later. They found far more material than they had originally expected. They found that there was an Orthodox point of view which was not usually included in the average textbook, and they reworked this material in the light of modern science and modern philosophy.

Yet it is to be noticed that they did not proceed by nullifying and neglecting theology. They did not endeavor to eliminate the supernatural and mystical sides of life and religion in order to exalt practical activity, but they endeavored to understand what was involved in the meaning of the terms which they were using constantly and unthinkingly. Since the World War and the Russian Revolution they have continued on this path.

The outstanding fact that Fr. Bulgakov states about the Church is the reality of the Church invisible. To him the saints and the dead in Christ are as really living as are the people upon this earth. The emphasis upon this at once changes all the philosophy of the Christian Faith, and this emphasis has always been unconsciously or subconsciously at the heart of the belief of the Russian peasant.

Then again there is a growing realization in the mind of the Orthodox that their differences with Rome are far deeper than the superficial objection to the Pope, for even he is only a symbol of the order of the West. The whole notion of *sobornost,* of the idea that infallibility lies in the Church, and not in any Council or hierarch, is again based on a study of the past, and a swinging away of Orthodox thought from the Western accretions after the fall of Constantinople. Perhaps there was some feeling for this in the West at the time of the Protestant movement, but it was swallowed up in rigid Western thinking and practical problems, and practical ethical demands overshadowed the traditional and ancient beliefs. In a word, Orthodox thought is trying to avoid the logical framework on which the Roman Catholic Church and Scholasticism is based. Where the West (and this includes

both Roman Catholicism and Protestantism) insists on answering every question with "Yes" or "No," the Orthodox shrink from such an answer. They shrink from a strictly mathematical formula and system, and seek a mystical answer, or a synthesis of contradictions. The result may seem the creation of a circle, and there may be something naïve in the idea that the only way to recognize an Oecumenical council is by its success and its acceptance by the mass of the Church which is expressed unconsciously and clearly, but through no definite system. Yet that is the Eastern way, and it remains to be seen whether it will not be successful, humanly speaking, in the long run. It remains to be seen whether there can be any more rigid test or certification than this.

It is the very antithesis to the Roman Catholic view of the Church as a disciplined army moving at the command of the Vicar of Christ. The Orthodox Church is saved from complete anarchy by the reality in the minds of the faithful of the presence of Christ among them. It is from the human standpoint the effect of an enlightened public opinion expressed under conditions that no propaganda can long control.

If the reader of this volume can once realize the point of view of Fr. Bulgakov, he will not find the book hard reading or difficult of comprehension. If he persists in thinking of the Church as an organization or an organism in this world and of this world, the book will make very little sense, but it is a consistent whole and the chapters follow along naturally on the one fundamental presupposition.

Even the chapters on the Saints and the Ikons will become clear and intelligible, once the essential unity of the Church visible and invisible is grasped. There is here no division between the Church Militant, the Church Expectant, and the Church Triumphant. All are together in one Church and on this basis all must be considered together. Fortunately, Fr. Bulgakov has omitted any discussion of the Divine Wisdom, for this is one of the points of theology still under discussion and it does not lend itself to simple treatment.

In the volume, Fr. Bulgakov touches on many problems of world organization very slightly, but many of the chapters on ethics, social problems, economics, etc., can be expanded on the principles that he has laid down as the tests and underlying bases of Orthodoxy. They are at best temporal problems, rather than eternal, and as such they must

be judged as of the time. We of the West have been more preoccupied with these, and perhaps there is truth in the words of Archbishop Stefan, Metropolitan of Sofia, that the West has tried by practical activity to keep from thinking the thoughts of God, and the East has tried by elaboration of ritual, and by emphasis on correct fulfillment of rites also to keep away from thinking the thoughts of God.

The work of Fr. Bulgakov has tried to put first things first. There may be questions as to certain details but in general the book follows the thoughts of the leading Orthodox scholars of the present time, especially of the Slavonic Orthodox scholars and thinkers. It is a valuable contribution to our knowledge of the spirit of Orthodoxy, and the translator and editor deserve their share of credit in making this book available in English. It is indeed an important milestone in the great task of making the inner life and thought of the Orthodox East known in the West, and Fr. Bulgakov has noted also many points in which the ideas of the Protestant world coincide with those of the Orthodox. These are worth consideration in the West.

Today the religious world needs to stop condemning the East for all of its failures and its impracticability. Western civilization and religion following the practical path are in almost the same chaos as the immovable East. Perhaps we shall need to learn from them, from their prior misfortunes, and it is not too much to believe that it is among the Orthodox thinkers, with their apparent vagueness and their obvious dislike for a decisive answer, that we may find a real solution for the conflicts between science, theology, and the other fields of thought and endeavor which are bothering us today.

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Church and State. Papers Read at the Summer School of Catholic Studies, Held at Cambridge, July 27 to August 6, 1935. With a Preface by Father C. Lattey, S. J. London: Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd., 1936. Pp. xi + 338. 7/6.

The papers read at the Summer School for Catholic Studies, Cambridge, England, during 1935 are here published and their theme is even more timely than that of the year previous.*

* *The Pre-Nicene Church. Papers Read at the Summer School of Catholic Studies Held at Cambridge, July 28 to August 6, 1934.* With a Preface by Father C. Lattey, S.J. London: Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd., 1935. Pp. xiv + 280. 7/6.

Part I is a historical study, tracing the relations between Church and State from the days of Roman emperor worship down to the present. There is no need to review history here,—suffice it to commend this survey for its utility and precision. It is clear against this background that there is really nothing new in the present opposition between various churches and various states. Part II is an attempt to contribute to the Catholic theory of opposition to a totalitarian state and this attempt calls for comment.

On the whole it is fair to say that the least dogmatic theory comes from the Professor of Dogmatic Theology at Forest Gate, London, the Rev. Fr. Alphonsus Bonnar, who follows quite closely the pronouncements of the Vatican and the official "claims of the Church" on this subject. In a Letter of 3885 (*Immortale Dei*) Pope Leo XIII wrote, "There must exist between these two powers (Church and State) a certain orderly connection, which may be compared to the union of soul and body in man. . . . One of the two has for its proximate and chief object the well-being of this mortal life; the other the everlasting joys of heaven. . . . Since, then, upon this ('supreme and final good in heaven') depends the full and perfect happiness of mankind, the securing of this end should be of all imaginable interests most urgent. Hence civil society, established for the common welfare, should not only safeguard the well-being of the community, but have also at heart the interests of its individual members, so as not in any way to hinder, but in every manner to render as easy as may be the possession of that highest and unchangeable good for which all should seek." (p. 227-8) And the present Pope, Pius XI, in 1931 when he condemned the Fascist *stato latria* contrasted the *natural* rights of the State and family with the *supernatural* rights of the Church. (p. 229-30) This is reasonably clear doctrine and

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The contents are as follows: "The Witness of the Gospels," by the Very Rev. John M. T. Barton, D.D.; "The Apostolic Age," by the Rev. C. Lattey, S.J.; "From St. Ignatius of Antioch to the Conversion of Constantine," by the Rev. Philip Hughes, Lic. Sc. Hist.; "The Early Christian Writers," by the Rev. C. C. Martindale, S.J.; "Paganism and Christianity: Legal Relations," by the Rev. Paulinus Lavery, O.F.M.; "The Pagan Apologists," by the Rev. P. G. N. Rhodes, D.D.; "The Origin of the Episcopate," by the Rev. Hugh Pope, O.P.; "The Eucharist during the First Three Centuries," by the Right Rev. Dom Fernand Cabrol, O.S.B.; "The Other Sacraments," by the Rev. B. Leeming, S.J.; "The Doctrine of the Holy Trinity in the Pre-Nicene Church," by the Rev. Aelfric Manson, O.P.; "Pre-Nicene Christology," by Fr. Alphonsus Bonnar, O.F.M., and a "Letter of Approbation from His Holiness Pope Pius XI."

Father Bonnar explains with admirable precision that the Church is one of several "juridically perfect" societies, *i.e.*, exercising complete and independent authority to pursue its *particular* (p. 244) and *distinct* (p. 249) purpose, *viz.*, "the *religious* good of men" (p. 251). This religious good is whatever in human life, external or internal, visible or invisible, contributes to the salvation (*eternal* welfare) of man. He points out that the distinction between temporal and eternal must not be identified with that between material and spiritual. Temporal welfare is "mainly material but not entirely so, for even in his temporal life man has intellectual activities (which are 'spiritual') which are not religious. The use of the word 'spiritual' as synonymous with 'religious' is very misleading and gives rise to much confusion" (p. 249). Furthermore, though the ends of Church and State are distinct, "there are parts of man's life in which *both* Church and State can rightly claim an interest, and, consequently, jurisdiction. These are technically called 'mixed' matters or objects" (p. 253). "Hence we must note as a general conclusion, that it is misleading to speak of material and spiritual objects, internal and external, etc.: the only satisfactory division is into ecclesiastical and civil jurisdiction" (p. 252). This is an excellent critical observation, which his colleagues, and Father Bonnar himself, might have taken more seriously. Hardly has he arrived at this conclusion, namely, that the real issue is between two types of jurisdiction or administration, not between two "objects" or realms, which are admittedly "mixed," than he lapses back into the familiar debate about "spiritual matters" (p. 256), "purely temporal affairs and purely spiritual matters" (p. 257), etc. Such terms not only beg the question, but have been purposely introduced into the issue because of their vagueness. They are useful symptons of what I, for one, should not hesitate to regard as a fact, that the ends of Church and State are not as distinct as they are supposed to be in theory, and, in general, that human life can not be clearly divided into the material and the spiritual, nor even the temporal and the eternal.

On the face of it, the papal distinctions between earthly and heavenly happiness and between natural and supernatural rights seem clear, whether they are credible or not. But on closer examination they reveal difficulties in their practical administration. According to Leo XIII's declaration, cited above, it is the State's duty to protect the Church, since the temporal welfare of man is subordinate to

the eternal. But the majority of papers in this discussion argue that State and Church must co-operate, though they admit that in theory the "concordat relationship" is difficult to justify. And Father Bonnar goes so far as to reverse the papal declaration by asserting that the Church has a duty to protect the State, to "succour humanity in suffering," and to listen to the cry of "practical men" who "look to the Church to save society" (p. 254). On what grounds should the Church assume such responsibilities? The Rev. Martindale defends it on the ground that "we possess definite and immutable principles, and we consider . . . our principles to be the only fully right ones, and alone able to save society even in these its earthly conditions" (p. 323). Similarly John Eppstein asserts that "the Catholic tradition offers the only coherent philosophy of life which is an alternative to . . . the ideal of the absolute Nation State" (p. 225). Such dogmatism goes far beyond the dogma of the Church and merely invites the opposing dogmatisms of secular totalitarianism. To be consistent, to say nothing of being reasonable, Churchmen would do well to renounce totalitarianism on their side and to admit, as the more authoritative pronouncements of the Church do, that the Church has its own restricted sphere and aim, the super-natural salvation of men in heaven.

In fact, however, the history of the issue reveals clearly the practical impossibility of restricting the "religious good" in this wise to a "particular" good. How Marsilius of Padua fought for that adjective, "particular"! Divine authority always carries with it an assumption of *moral* authority. The Rev. Lewis Watt, for example, asserts boldly that the popes are the "guardians of morality," that "no human activities are emancipated from the sovereignty of the moral law," and that "the earthly heads of the Church are entrusted by God with the duty of declaring the moral law, applying it to particular problems and urging its faithful execution," and that "the economic activities of mankind are, in their moral bearings, a proper subject for the Church's authoritative guidance" (p. 302). Similarly Mr. Evennett of Trinity College, Cambridge, begins his discussion by distinguishing between governmental authority and "that kind of authority which is itself intrinsically moral" (p. 185) and then proceeds to give a legalistic interpretation of "the moral order" as defined in "divine and natural law." With such a view of morality,

such a holy totalitarianism, what argument is possible? If all morality is dictated by God to the Church which passes it on to men and their governors, would not all men be morally and not merely "to salvation" subject to the Roman Pontiff? And is it reasonable on the part of Catholics to *assume* such a theory of the moral order as the starting point of discussion, when it is clearly the bone of contention? Mr. Evennett, for example, after he has stated his faith in the moral order admits that the whole tendency of modern thought has been directed against it, and that "today, if morality *is* allowed some form of institutional expression and safeguard, it is, as like as not, a morality essentially popular in origin and therefore almost infinitely mutable" (p. 203). If morality is *de facto* "almost infinitely mutable" to what purpose is it to insist on *the* moral order? And does he not give his case away when he pleads that the Church be granted freedom "to teach *a* morality," or "the natural rights of mankind *as she conceives them*" (p. 205, italics mine)? When the Church must *de facto* do business with the princes of darkness, make treaties and concordats with them, and beg for the liberty due one conscience among many, of what use is it to pretend that there is a single moral law *de jure*? Must not such a dogmatism end as a legal fiction? How much more realistic and reasonable the legal pluralism of Figgis, for example, who does not try to meet the political totalitarianism of the State with an equally arbitrary moral totalitarianism of the Church.

The speciousness of the moral claims put forward in this volume (for the reasons given, I hesitate to call them the claims of the Church) is further apparent in the attempts made to give *the* moral order a particular meaning in terms of contemporary society and temporal happiness. For example, in 1934 the Bishops of the Netherlands, in defending "the right of regulating the moral life of the faithful," asserted that "reason teaches us and revelation confirms it, that man has personal rights, . . . bound up with the personal destiny of man, . . . of *free personalities*, each with his own destiny" (p. 230-1). Mr. Eppstein, as well as several of his clerical co-religionists, asserts that international exchange is a "natural law" which the Church must defend. Others call their God the God of peace, and interpret the moral order in terms of internationalism, whose chief spokesman is the Church. They defend the "rights of parents to bring up their children according to their own convictions"

(p. 229), but assert that it is the duty *of the State* to protect the family against conjugal infidelity, "sex naturalism," and "artificial birth-control." I could mention many other instances of filling in the moral law of nature or of God with what are at best particular versions of positive law.

Evidently the question of the Church's political duty toward the British State was agitating many minds, for by an ingenious argument Mr. F. R. Hoare pleads with the Catholics not to form a distinct party. His reason, taken over largely from the Fascists, is that "the party system is passing everywhere" (p. 282). "It is useless at this time of day to think in terms of the kind of political action which the Liberal State has accustomed us to think of as natural, for the ground has been cut away under our feet. The Liberal State has been succeeded by the Unitary State inspired by principles utterly opposed to ours and leaving the minimum of spontaneous organic life. We cannot build on such foundations. We can best meet the new situation by growing social organs of our own" (p. 301). "I believe that our best chance of advancing here, and of putting up a fight against the materialistic and non-moral or immoral economic and social outlook in which we are immersed, would be to develop as many as possible of the ordinary organs of economic and social life among ourselves, beginning, of course, with settlements on the land, but including as wide a range as possible, from clinics to co-operate banking, the idea being to put our own principles into practice (which is the best way for Englishmen to get a grasp of them) and at the same time to grow a social nexus to correspond with the spiritual nexus that already weaves us together. This embodiment of the principles of the Christian life in organs of social and economic life, so far from being materialistic or in any other way alien to spirituality, is almost a spiritual necessity if Christianity is to be lived at all" (p. 300).

This is another indication of how "mixed" the spiritual and material are both in practice and in Catholic thought. It is added evidence, I believe, of the wisdom of Father Bonnar's remark that to make progress in distinguishing Church and State we would do well to concentrate on their distinctive types of administration and jurisdiction rather than on their supposedly distinct objects. For, as Father Bonnar wittily observes, "the Church does not directly affect man after he has departed this life," and though "the ultimate scope of the Church

is this after-death welfare of man," the Church's "whole activity is concerned with bringing men to union with God in this life" (p. 249-50). Both secular sense and Christian doctrine suggest that God has also designed the State for this purpose, and the family, and commerce, and the arts; that the various means He has chosen for saving man place upon man the responsibility of learning to use them cooperatively, instead of assuming that they are by nature one subordinated to the other. In any realistic view of the situation both the assumption of particular and distinct ends and the assumption of a single highest good beg the question.

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Creative Society: A Study of the Relation of Christianity to Communism. By JOHN MACMURRAY. New York: Association Press, 1936. Pp. 168. $1.50.

Christianity Confronts Communism. By MATTHEW SPINKA. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1936. Pp. xii + 221. $2.00.

The exact relation between Communism and Christianity will probably continue under discussion as long as both these points of view—either as embodied in institutions or as expounded in theory—go on existing in the world. Since the Russian Revolution and the emergence of Communism as far more than a theoretical program, this discussion has naturally increased in both volume and intensity. There has been in recent years a constant outpouring of articles, pamphlets, and books on the subject. While the two volumes under review cannot be said to reach any definite solutions, they both illustrate, in differing ways, the complicated problems involved in the relation of Communism to religion in general and to Christianity in particular.

Professor Macmurray presents the interesting thesis that, when properly interpreted, true Communism and true Christianity turn out to be basically alike in their ethical goals, their economic theories, and their metaphysical principles. In describing "The Religion of Jesus" he states that the teaching of the gospels "can be expressed in such a way as to exhibit the main theoretical conceptions of Communism—the unity of theory and practice, the dialectical nature of social development, the importance of class consciousness, and the fundamental part played by economics in the social process—as

structural ideas in the religion of Jesus." According to Dr. Macmurray, Jesus was a class-conscious revolutionary, opposed to the artificial limitations of nationality and organized religion, who saw "that the way to the Kingdom of Heaven lay through the destruction of the existing social order."

Many religious radicals have supported this view that Jesus was the first Communist and that Communism itself offers the this-worldly fulfilment of Christianity. Less frequently found, however, is the point which the author makes about Christianity and Communism being fundamentally akin in their philosophical outlook. This remarkable synthesis Professor Macmurray achieves by defining religion as primarily "the expression of the community"; by ruling out from Christianity supernaturalism, and especially the doctrine of personal immortality; by arguing that Communism is against only "pseudo-religion," other-worldly dualism, "the religion of illusion" whose symbol "is the denial of the reality of death"; and by claiming that Communism really believes in God because it believes in a "process of history" which works "in all human life and in all nature to create a perfected humanity," and which "must eventually triumph, because it is the reality of the world."

Before commenting on Professor Macmurray's book let me turn to the more commonplace one of Professor Spinka. His study presents the most striking possible contrast, for Dr. Spinka sees Communism and Christianity as diametrically opposed on almost every issue in philosophy and social life. In order to support his thesis and show why Christianity is so much preferable, he has to exaggerate the vices of Communism and the virtues of Christianity in an extremely unrealistic fashion. In his discussion of violence, however, he gives the game away. "Christians," the author says, "are committed to the way of love" in contrast to the Communists who are committed to the way of force. But then he adds that, of course, in some situations it is necessary for even Christians to use force as the means that "love and good will" must resort to in order to attain their objectives,—as in most of the international and civil wars of the last two thousand years, someone might suggest!

Professor Spinka also makes the grievous error of considering the world-wide relation of Christianity and Communism almost entirely in the light of what has occurred in Soviet Russia. He forgets that

in the application of Communist or Marxist principles regarding religion, or anything else, *every country is unique*. The invincible backwardness of the Greek Orthodox Church, and the fact that it was officially part and parcel of the Tsarist tyranny, created a special situation in Russia. Similar, but by no means identical, situations exist today in Catholic countries such as Spain. But in other nations, and in the Anglo-Saxon democracies particularly, we find things very different. In this connection Dr. Spinka might well have pondered over the fact that in many parts of the world, and very noticeably in America, Communists are working in active united fronts against Fascism with both members and officials of the Christian Church.

Professor Macmurray fortunately makes allowance for such factors, though from the Marxist point of view there is a great deal to criticize in his book. First and foremost, he reaches his re-alignment of Christianity and Communism only through redefining both in a way that few Christians and no Communists would accept. To remove all supernaturalism from Christianity seems as far-fetched as it would be to cut out completely the economic interpretation of history from Communism. And equally extreme is the claim that Communism propounds a belief in God. This does not follow, even if Communism does hold to the inevitable triumph of its cause, for at some stage in the analysis of society science *may* be able to predict *some* events with a certainty comparable to its forecasts in the fields of physics and chemistry. But in any case the theory of inevitability is an extremely moot one in Marxist thought; and there is good reason to believe that Marx himself talked about the inevitability of Communism primarily in a hortatory sense.

There are other valid criticisms that can be made of Professor Macmurray's synthesis; and I do not think it can eventually stand up as more than a very arresting *tour de force*. What I discover in both "Creative Society" and "Christianity Confronts Communism" is an underlying, though unexpressed, tendency to regard a particular socio-ethical system and a particular metaphysical system as strictly deducible from each other, and as therefore inseparably constituting a special philosophy in general. Much more sensible, it seems to me, would be to recognize the obvious fact that Christian theists can and do logically support the socio-ethical program of Communism, and that bourgeois atheists can and do logically support the socio-

ethical program of Capitalism. In short, one's social or economic or ethical views do not logically determine one's metaphysical or theological position. Nor, in a psychological sense, does one's economic status.

It would also be clarifying on all sides if it were acknowledged that a judicious use of quotations from the Bible, and especially the New Testament, can build up a case for almost any conceivable socio-economic system. The teachings of Jesus are certainly not as unambiguous in relation to twentieth century civilization as Professor Macmurray, from the left, and Professor Spinka, from the right, would have us think. Both authors, in addition, make the mistake of arguing that Communism has no use for love and the love-motive. This is a misleading over-simplification. Not only do Communists demonstrate a high form of loyalty and comradeship toward one another, but their supreme end is an international classless society where the strifes and hates of the present-day world will be no more.

The Communists do believe that the only way to attain the brotherhood of man is to remove the obstacles to this goal which are inherent in the capitalist system. They think that force is necessary and justified to get rid of Capitalism because the capitalists always attempt to destroy the democratic process as soon as it seriously threatens their property interests. And the Communists add that the question of using violence is a false issue as between Communism and Christianity since throughout its history the Christian Church has had little difficulty in reconciling itself to supporting, and indeed blessing violence whenever such a method seemed, to use Dr. Spinka's own revealing term, "legitimate."

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Religion and Science. By Bertrand Russell. New York: Henry Holt, 1935. Pp. 271. $2.00.

Religion and Science is a minor addition to a bulky and wearisome literature. It is another sample of commonplace thinking on a theme that calls for great depth and imagination, that demands a penetrating insight and original development. The secondary character of Russell's thinking on religion follows from a wrong approach. Instead of taking the critical annihilation of outgrown dogmas more or less for granted he exhausts himself attacking the premises of orthodoxy.

Occasionally he catches a distinctly contemporary note, but fails to sustain it and pitch his book on this high plateau. Were he to do this we would have significant thinking on an important theme. The failure to apply constructive criticism on this vast subject is the outgrowth of indifference and not of inability. The material of this book is loosely put together, belated and inaccurate, and closely resembles a popular digest.

But it would be palpably unfair not to give Russell credit for his cathartic value to American religious thinking. Its need is urgent. One despairs of the typical product of American religious writers; they still proceed on assumptions that reveal astonishing credulity. Their unquestioned premises and, more frequently, the high points which are exultingly expounded in a sketchy form and taken as self-evident truths, disclose their superficial understanding of contemporary forces. For such, Russell is an excellent housecleaner of old cobwebs. With bold strokes and the elimination of detail he shows with telling effect how complete is the change. His refutation of the belief that religion can make assertions of what exists independently of science is a useful reiteration. A clear case is also made in showing the dangerous absurdity of identifying religion with the numinous. The attack upon cosmic purpose, which has extensive supporters even among liberal religious thinkers, is done with a devastating thoroughness. While this latter assault may seem unduly violent and superfluous to many it has an important place in clearing the ground for a reasonable religion. While not especially significant these items probably need to be repeated many times, but whether this book can and will reach those who most need to hear is doubtful.

Russell stands as an opponent of religion. This rejection of religion is part of a larger philosophy of rejection which extends to the whole of life. The sharp contrast of the world of experience to the world of abstract possibility, with a definite preference for the latter, has turned him against the world of experience. If Russell conceived of religion as development of the ideal possibilities of every situation, rather than belief in the dogmas of historic religions, there might be some hope. This hope is without promise, for it is not the actual possibilities of particular events or relationships that charm him; it is the kind of possibility one encounters in logic. Wanting in interest and profuse in irritation he cannot discuss the subject of religion dispassionately.

Is this want of sympathy responsible for wilful misrepresentation? A narrow definition can destroy anything, and Russell defines religion in such a way as to make it the easy prey of science. For instance, in discussing demonology and medicine he accepts the premises of an ultra-conservative, that genuine acceptance of the Bible is belief in everything it contains including witches. In the same way, that historic relic—resurrection of the body—is treated as an integral part of Christianity. By accepting orthodox doctrine as a final statement, and taking no account of change and abrupt departures he finds it easy to deprive religion of every semblance of reasonableness. The tactic is so simple as to be absurd: hold religion down to its primitive barbarities and fight it in the name of science and enlightenment. This method is reminiscent of the village atheist. It is not cognizant of the multitudinous and contradictory forms religion has assumed, and doubtless will continue to assume, so long as man aspires toward something better.

Besides a fixed and narrow interpretation it is charged that religion encouraged man's natural savagery. Persecutions have been a stumbling block to many, yet it is difficult to decide whether they are urged against religion because religion is a conspicuous offender or used merely as a stock argument. Religion has employed, and in some areas continues to countenance, brutality in repressing ideas it regards as dangerous. Enlightened religionists offer absolutely no defense of this barbarous practice. It covers them with shame, and they applaud the vindication which an outraged people take upon the betrayal of the religious ideal. Historical persecutions of the dim past are regarded as a *fait accompli* that are a warning, but no longer a bar to sympathetic interest in this phase of our culture. Yet the matter is raised by men like Russell with surprising regularity, indiscriminately applied, and is a stain they refuse to forget. Russell is wrong in speaking of it as an essential and fundamental characteristic of religion, and admits as much when he writes that economic and political motives have been perhaps the main cause of persecution. Tender-minded on this point he shies from any movement associated with persecution of opinion, whether it be from the right or the left.

This aversion is unmistakably a mark of sensitiveness, but would exclude most institutions from sympathetic consideration if strictly applied. Science is credited with standing for the diminution of suffer-

ing but condemnation falls upon its head, too, for devising implements of mass murder. Nevertheless, the argument of brutality serves as a good and final reason for disposing of religion. It would serve equally well for opposing labor unions. It is manifestly unfair to dismiss all that religion has done in a civilizing way because it has sometimes disgraced itself by resorting to persecution. It is unwise to disregard an institution so firmly established and which may be won over as an instrument of spirituality with a facility that men do not realize.

Russell's excursion into ethics is as disastrous as his dabbling in religion. He attacks the traditional belief that certain things are universal and final goods in themselves. To a degree he shares this belief in an inverted form and plunges into an extreme subjectivism when his search for the trademark of intrinsic value proves fruitless. Values of the kind he is looking for do not exist and he knows it. But more important is the fact that they are not as atomic as he asserts. He would have us believe they are altogether underived with no arguments pertinent on either side. Actually we find considerable agreement on judgments of value. The ground for this identical judgment is not the discovery of the water mark of genuineness, but certain physical and emotional needs present in most people that seek a like satisfaction. The trap into which Russell has fallen was set by his own background of atomism. It makes it possible for him to discuss the subject of value "independent of its effects," and was bound to end in some absurd position of subjectivism. A thing is good if its effects are good, and apart from them it is nothing so far as morality is concerned. It is by taking cognizance of effects that ethics gets its start and to rule them out is to wander in confusion. Instead of science having nothing to say on questions of value as he asserts, it has a lot to say. We are floundering today because superstition and class interest has had so much to say. Science can take as its materials the things men find good, and can clarify, harmonize, and elaborate them. To let the subject rest on a matter of taste because "the good" doesn't exist is to surrender all hope of a reasonable ethic. And Russell comes to this, we just like what we like and no compelling reasons can be given to support a cultivated taste. This implies the complete surrender of ethics and return to the morass of an anarchistic individualism.

Russell gives signal evidence that he is not an important voice in

religion. The only qualification to this sweeping assertion is his usefulness in skilfully uncovering the shaky substructure of traditional beliefs and chronicling the change. His unsympathetic attitude, his failure to grasp the essential meaning of religion, and his inability to indicate the course an enlightened religion would take, deprive him of the right to speak with authority. The real problem today is the need for a new approach which will begin with the present state of confusion and develop a religious answer to the problems of our times. Such an approach would constitute a decisive departure with incidental references to the past and not a rehearsal of that past. A tirade against the mass of superstitions with which science has had to contend is useless. Relieved of these burdens science has found plenty of obstacles in its way more difficult than popular religion. To have entertained a grudge against religion because of its opposition to science has resulted in isolating it and unwittingly in giving support to conservative spokesmen. The need for reconstruction is paramount; the time for repeating earlier grievances is past. Searching examination, radical severance with the past, and a bold imaginative development is the imperative need of the moment.

To this end *Science and Religion* helps not at all. It is an unimportant contribution to the reconstruction of religion. Its glaring weakness appears when facts are set forth which would have been shocks to the nineteenth century and to them are appended the words, "but it isn't believed in now." This book is not scholarly enough to be of use to an informed person, is full of inaccuracies for the lay reader and not sensational enough to entice popular interest. It is difficult to find a reason for the writing of it.

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Glaube und Unglaube: III Teil: Jugendlichen Psychologie. Verhandlungen des Ersten Internationale Religionspsychologische Kongress. Edited by KARL BETH. Dresden: Ungelenk, 1933. Pp. 103. 7 ö.sh.

The third portion of the report of the 1931 Congress of the Internationale religionspsychologische Gesellschaft was nominally dedicated to the discussion of adolescent psychology. In content, however, the papers cover a much wider scope, dealing also with problems in peda-

gogy, scattered social influences upon religious disbelief, and the development of various religious concepts among not only adolescents but university students and adults as well. From the point of view of a purely experimental psychologist these papers as reports of observations are lacking in many respects the precision which would be desirable, were they experimental contributions. There is no attempt, for example, to make a statistical summary of the questionnaire results, and the questionnaires themselves are usually not framed so as to elicit specific and unambiguous answers. Nevertheless, these men have gained valuable insights into the problems with which they are concerned, and this may be more important than rigid establishment of facts and relations.

Professor Karl Beth, who writes the introduction, defines the central problem of the congress as the psychology of disbelief or in other words the problems of belief. The search for the answer to this question must begin with three main problems: (1) to describe and define an act of faith; (2) to determine the inner workings of the religious man (i.e. the kind of man who is sensitive to this kind of experience); (3) to study religious experiences; he concedes that religious experiences may be studied also from their theological and sociological aspects, but this congress must limit itself to the experiential or psychological aspects. Psychologically there are differences in approach as represented by the totalitarian and existential schools of psychology. These may be roughly distinguished in their approach by the fact that the totalitarian school emphasizes the individual experience as being determined by a larger total experience: a card player's gesture is meaningless unless we know what game he is playing and the particular point in the game at which he stands at that moment. The existential school through penetrating the depths of personality seeks to find the little part which gives energy to the particular experience; in the case of the card player all of his activity might be seen as manifestations of the desire to win. The various papers of the congress exemplify these approaches, the Germans and those influenced by the German psychological approach tending toward the totalitarian approach, the French and Swiss toward the existential approach.

In many of the European countries Protestant and Catholic religious beliefs are taught in the schools, just as history or mathematics would be taught in this country. Dr. Körber, who read a paper on

"psychic problems of the young teacher of religion" (die seelische Not des jungen Religionslehrers), is professor of religious pedagogy in a training school for protestant teachers of religion at Dortmund. In his paper he has drawn from his conversations with students and from written replies to questions. He finds that many of his students on entering the training school are in tacit opposition to teaching religion. The students report having been bored in the lower classes, having learned much by heart, and even though there was teaching of history of religion in the upper classes, few students earnestly felt the religious significance of the material. Despite this background no student actually gave up the idea of teaching religion. Some continued, to be sure, on purely economic grounds, as this training would help them to get a teaching position. Others through their study of teaching religion acquired a sincere feeling for the subject. After training two types of problems resulted for the teachers: (1) The person with strong religious traditions, who seemed through his training to get a wider grasp of religion, became concerned with his feeling of responsibility to impart religious training to the young student. (2) The person with little religious background or inclination generally found himself in the position of talking over the heads of his students. At some point with this latter type the realization comes that he has been speaking of religion in a vacuum. Then the problem of the relation of christianity to life becomes meaningful, and the instruction tends to become more tangible. The same may occur with a person who does not believe in the literal word of the scriptures yet senses his responsibility to give orthodox training. This type may have personal understanding but be without the breadth to answer all questions. When he finds his weakness, the problem again becomes one of relating the teachings to life in sympathetic terms for the student. In general Dr. Körber maintains that it is impossible satisfactorily to instruct students when a teacher has a view of religion from the outside; it then becomes a problem to relate the teaching to life, and here is where students and teachers without real feeling meet their greatest problems.

Dr. Alfred Römer in his paper "the loss of childhood beliefs" (Verlust des Kinderglaubens) holds that the pubertal crisis is the natural result of the necessary clash between the childish wish-world and the adult world. At the period of transition children may pas-

sively accept the world of adult values or follow another coeval current by demanding intellectual arguments for their religious tenets.

To investigate the crisis Dr. Römer gave questionnaires to 160 students in a *Gymnasium* at Leipsiz. The ages of these boys varied between 14 and 18 years. The questions for the most part invited discursive answers. From the answers various courses of development of childhood beliefs were found. One group stated that they began about 11 years of age to question religious concepts and became negatively inclined toward them later, finally coming to think of religion as childish or primitive in content. Another group had no childhood beliefs at all but first began to discuss and realize the problems at about 12 and 13 years of age when a tentative position was taken. Another group discarded the anthropomorphic conception of God and considered these earlier beliefs as fictitious or allegorical. Those that turned toward religion, usually at the time of confirmation, found the crisis making their concepts more inward rather than projected actualities. To the question, "What remains of your childhood beliefs?" a considerable number mentioned their belief in an all-merciful, omnipotent God, and revealed their faith in immortality. One-third of the total group declared there was no basic change in their childhood beliefs. In general, very few had negated all their beliefs, though there was a considerable number who were skeptical about specific beliefs, but this skepticism did not usually touch upon the ethical aspects of their beliefs. The skepticism is based on scientific evidence against Christ and the redemption, upon sociology and ethics, and upon contradictions within religious usages. The paper concludes that there are not a great number of real agnostics and that many points of religious belief remain or could remain after the crisis. It is the problem of pedagogy to help the youth over these critical periods. To accomplish this Dr. Römer recommends five points: (a) Teachers of religion must take an aggressive position against intellectualism by not acting as if one were fighting for a lost cause. (b) The sources of conflict must be removed from religious practices by making such things as confirmation a more satisfactory event and abandoning cenobitic sentimentality over the liturgy. (c) One must fight against various wide-spread destructive influences as the breaking down of the family, the rise of communism and pernicious theaters. (d) All things concerned with religion should be made as clear as possible

and the teachings should be brought into a definite relation to contemporary life. (e) The older respected people who set the ideals for the younger must through their conduct give sound examples.

Dr. Carl Schneider of Riga read a paper on "the opposition of university students to religion" (der Widerstand des Studenten gegen Religiöses). His material was based on questionnaires and interviews with students at Riga, Cologne and Marburg universities and Wittenberg College. The opposition, he finds, may be purely social-psychological, identifying a group with a particular set of values. For example, an engineering student said, "Religion was a primitive form of technology. Instead of machines there were Gods." Another form of opposition is purely intellectual, varying from a shallow comprehension to deep conflict between brain and heart. For example a student of philology on hearing the quotation "Man makes God of His own image," said, "The theologians may, but it is pretty presumptuous of them." A more serious and thoughtful student commented in an interview, "There is and must be a higher being. I call it God. But why I must derive from this assertion a Christian outlook is not clear to me." Most of the intellectual objections seemed to be based on purely popular notions of religion, and few had taken the trouble really to study these matters. Other objections were esthetic, one group finding nothing beautiful in religion, the other being so enraptured by the esthetic that the transcendental aspects were completely overlooked. "Can you imagine anything more vulgar than the 'death of Buddha'; he poisons himself with rice and greasy pork." An American student with positivistic inclinations had a picture of the Virgin Mary next to which he stood two candles in altar form; back of the picture was concealed a bottle of bootleg whiskey. This student said he liked the picture very much but had no religious sentiments connected with it.

The greatest number of objections are raised on ethical grounds. Some feel that any moral principles are obstacles to leading the most desirable kind of life. Another group sees religious observances as hypocritical; e.g., in the christian world many fail to observe except in theory good will toward all. Others find such christian practices as penance to be valueless in themselves. Another group wishes to be free to determine its own course of action without the confinements of dogma. Others object that religious practices remove re-

sponsibility from one's shoulders. In general the most poignant criticism is that people really live for their own sakes, and the christian faith does not sufficiently emphasize one's social duty. Political objections may play a part; e.g., the pacifists object to christian wars. Purely personal objections are also present; some fear the loss of status by appearing too sentimental or sissified if they say their prayers or go to church. The writer concludes that christianity can only be accepted when it takes a functional part in our society. Christianity will first be accepted when it aids reemployment, reduces poverty and extinguishes war. Only then can the objections be overcome.

In true existential style Dr. Henri Clavier of Montpellier presented a paper entitled "the responsibility of the believers for the formation of the disbelieving complex" (die Verantwortlichkeit der Gläubigen für die Bildung des Unglaubenskomplex). He reasons that because most people are unable to account for their attitude of antipathy or indifference toward religion, the reason must lie in a deeper stratum of personality than the conscious stratum. Five instincts are postulated, and around these there arise five disbelief complexes. (1) The sexual disbelief complex; this is exemplified by the person who is educated in a strongly repressed manner, who is consequently surrounded with mysteries and is thus utterly at the mercy of any one introducing him to the solution of the mysteries. Such a person is bound to be disillusioned at any moment. André Gide exemplifies this course and has become an active agnostic. (2) Disbelief arising from repression of vital functions; vital functions are distinguished from the sexual instinct in that ". . . the sexual instinct is only one very characteristic manifestation." André Gide is also an example of this, educational repression leading to a complete anarchism. (3) Disbelief arising as a defense of personal autonomy; a strong personality may through religious repression blow off the top in volcanic fashion, leading to anarchism or communism. An example is also given of the converse, where a girl brought up among disbelievers becomes a believer in reaction against her education. (4) Disbelief of esthetic origin; groups of neo-pagans, poets and artists of the renaissance may be considered in this light; Boccaccio is perhaps a good illustration. (5) Disbelief of ethical origin; many may be led by the hypocrisies of the church to rebel and enter communistic or pacifistic movements.

Such reasons for shattering of faith are all directly attributable to the believers. Professor Clavier points out, however, that the disbelievers are also partially responsible because of their over-emphasis on personal maximation.

A paper on "the present conceptions of salvation," (der Heilsgedanke in der Gegenwart), was read by Professor Georges Berguer of Geneva. He confesses that salvation is an ideal or idea which through the course of history has never been stable. He maintains, nevertheless, that "one can to a certain extent desire and strive for salvation, at the same time denying it and casting it away on account of its unlikelihood." He framed a questionnaire containing the question whether spiritual needs and ethical wishes would find solution through the thought of salvation and whether this idea moves the modern man. Only ten per cent of the questionnaires which were sent out were returned, and few of the replies on these were more than brief notes. From this he concludes that the question is not of wide appeal. The questionnaire is as follows:

1. *Do you expect something from life?*
2. *Do you think that there is a meaning independent of you to be given to your personal life?*
3. *What is your ideal? Is it purely personal? Social? Political? Esthetic? Moral? Or religious?*

He finds in general not a shying from the Christian idea of salvation "but rather an absence of what one could call the feeling for salvation, a void, a poverty of feeling for human misery, in short, a self-contentment and satisfaction with things which clips the wings for higher striving. . . ." As example the following answer to question 1 is quoted: "Yes, I expect much of life and know that the kind of life I lead is determined by the kind of thoughts I have." Another example may be seen in the following answer to question 2: "The meaning of life depends upon one's ideas about death." Evidently there is only a very shallow feeling for the magnificence of true religious striving. Professor Berguer concludes that outside the immediate fold of the church there is no real religious outlook upon life.

To inquire further into the concepts of salvation he gave to a group of girls the topic "Redemption or what I understand by the words 'I am saved.'" A single example is quoted in full. This example is more or less orthodox in its trend. The individual believes in an innate

sense of sin; if one follows its guiding, one is better able to form a union with Jesus, a personal benefactor. Sin is straying from God. Union with God is loving Him and acting socially. One should live not under the dictates of law but under mercy, for mercy does not nullify law but realizes it. This kind of outlook, Professor Berguer believes, is held by few. The words of the church are meaningless for the majority, beyond their frame of reference as guiding principles. The reason for this is that either the loss of a sense of sin has destroyed the ideal or the ideal the sense of sin. Modern determinism with its absence of meaning levels the meaning of existence to a hollow searching for daily bread.

The last paper "factors in the psychology of thought in the origin and strengthening of difficulties of belief," (Denkpsychologische Faktoren in der Entstehung und Erstärkerung von Glaubensschwierigkeiten), was read by Professor Lindworsky of Prague. A difficulty in belief is distinguished from disbelief in that the former is any problem arising from thinking about religious matters, whereas disbelief is synonymous under the Catholic church with heresy. Memory, it is well recognized, may be aided by composing the individual items into a larger unit; thus the numbers 2941 may be held indefinitely in memory if one forms the numbers into a larger category by seeing them as the date of the discovery of America in reverse order. The greater the number of elements and the wider their diversity the more difficult it is to form a complex and to reproduce them. As an example of a very narrow complex of reproduction Professor Lindworsky mentions an idiot-savant who was able to give the day of the month on which Easter falls for any year between 1582 and 2000. This in comparison with philosophical systems is a very narrow breadth of complex, and it was thus possible for a person of low mentality to accomplish this apparent feat. The smaller the complex of elements the greater the facility of reproduction.

If difficulties in belief are to be overcome, a larger number of elements must be unified into a complex. These elements will be more easily available when a problem is encountered and consequently be more accessible to a person with difficulties of belief. In puberty a factor opposing this broadening of the complex of reproduction through maturation is feeling. Teachers must work against this feeling factor if they are to overcome difficulties in belief, at the same time

recognizing that overcoming difficulties may lead to strengthening of belief. One manner of overcoming these difficulties is the presentation of religion so as to make the reproduction complex narrower. This may be done by presenting the material to students in a manner which enables them to synthesize it more easily.

A friend of the reviewer once brought up the question whether there is any phenomenon in current psychology which is neither biological or social in origin. If it were biological, the matter could best be studied by physiologists; were it social, it would better be studied by sociologists. However true this may be, the problem of belief would appear to the writer to be more easily clarified in social rather than psychological terms. The common sense of today was the esoteric philosophy of yesterday, and slowly through social intercourse scientific terms have filtered into the tool chest of the masses. We hear daily little boys talking of *energy;* certainly it lacks the precision of Newton's thought, yet it is an approximation, certainly a homonym. That men are descended from monkeys is the popular version of Darwin's evolution of the species. It would seem that these concepts are the pillars of popular positivistic cosmology. Though a positivistic ethics has not yet replaced Christian ethics as Professor Römer indicated, we may observe the rotting of various institutions and *mores* such as the patriarchal family and complete sex muteness. This is certainly a sign of the demolition of christian ethics. All this is social, not in the least psychological in terms, and to the reviewer this vein would seem more fruitful than investigation of individual experience. Of course we find among the paraphrased papers of this congress reference to the social aspects of disbelief as in Professor Römer's reference to political unrest or Professor Schneider's reference to group values. These mentions are, however, little more than background to the central theme of experience and are not looked upon as perhaps *the* factors of disbelief. To bring people to the doors of the church then would seem a sociological problem, and, if we are to control the tides, we must seek social measures. The psychological aspects when the social are cared for will then take care of themselves.

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BOOK NOTES

The Spirit of Man in Asian Art. By Lawrence Binyon. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935. Pp. xv + 217. 70 Plates. $4.00.

The six lectures given by Lawrence Binyon at Harvard College during the academic year 1933-1934 have been published in an attractive volume with many of the same illustrations. The author and lecturer in his introduction states that he has not attempted a complete survey of the field, but that he has selected from certain epochs and trends of art in China, Japan, and India elements which seem most typical of the spiritual expression of the art of these people. Mr. Binyon's fruitful activity in the British Museum makes it understandable that his preference is for painting and graphic art.

This publication augments the already large number of the general introductions to the art of Asia. However, the distinctive character of this work in contrast to others, lies in its humanistic approach to an interpretation of art. Binyon is interested in the Humanism of the East. Religion and philosophy, literature and history, as outward manifestation of the mind of man are used to explain the author's selection of art objects. The strength of the book lies in the description of the atmosphere in which these creative processes took place. Throughout the work, the author uses for comparison the art of the West, which for many people will facilitate an understanding of the art of Asia. In the consideration of the style there frequently is a power and eloquence which linger with the reader, as do the expressions of a great poet.

In a survey which is introduction and conclusion in one, it would be unjust to criticize details in fields in which many scholars have specialized for a long time. Mr. Binyon is frequently inclined toward the purely aesthetic consideration of art objects, especially in the earliest periods. He notes the religious and magical character of this art only reluctantly. Finally he concludes "the instinct to draw came first." On the contrary, Paleolithic man was certainly not moved by "the impulse to capture life," but rather saw his existence menaced by supernatural powers, which he tried to control by conjuration and magical spells. The artists of Neolithic time may have been "born decorators," yet even their simple "lines and curves" had a religious and magical meaning.

Among the illustrations the early bronzes of China unfortunately are missing. There is little space given to the culture in which they were created, yet these mean more, perhaps, for the artistic evolution of Chinese art than all the subsequent monuments of Buddhism. The fact that in ancient China vessels bear cultural symbolism, should not be overlooked in any introduction to the art of the Far East.

However, the wish entertained by the critical reader that more emphasis

be placed on the earlier period, in no way detracts from the aesthetic appeal of this book. ALFRED SALMONY
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Buddhist Meditation in the Southern School: Theory and Practice for Westerners. By G. CONSTANT LOUNSBERY, B.Sc. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1936. Pp. xvii + 178. $2.00.

In his foreword to this work by the President of Les Amis du Bouddhisme, Paris, W. Y. Evans-Wentz writes: "Most treatises on meditation and Yoga so far published in the Occident are chiefly expository, in a philosophical or historical way, rather than practical. But here, within these covers, we have, at last, a treatise which presents the essential technique and methods of meditation in its Buddhistic form so clearly and simply that any person of average intelligence desirous of practicing such meditation can do so without difficulty, without danger, and without recourse to a *guru.*" In Part I the author gives an exposition of the teachings of the Hinayana, Buddhism. In Part II she outlines a practical system with variations, usually sentimental simplifications, "adapted to the Western mind." M. B.

The Prajñâ-pâramitâ-hridaya-Sûtra. Sanscrit text, translation and commentary. Point Loma, Calif.: Theosophical University Press, 1936.

The Theosophical University Press is to be congratulated on its newly inaugurated project of printing reproductions of original Sancrit texts. The problem of adapting the Devanâgarî characters to the linotype machine has been successfully solved, a great advance over the expensive method of hand composition in use hitherto. It will now be possible to make Sanscrit texts increasingly available to students.

The Spirit of Zen: A Way of Life, Work and Art in the Far East. By ALAN W. WATTS. New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc. 1936. Pp. 136. $1.25.

This excellent little volume is a new addition to *The Wisdom of the East* series. The author modestly makes no claim at originality or completeness of treatment, and makes grateful acknowledgment of his indebtedness to Professor Suzuki to whom "we of the West owe almost all our knowledge of Zen." But Mr. Watts might well make the claim that he has presented the Western world with a simple, clear-cut, and careful introduction to this mysterious *Zen* which puzzles us so much with its paradoxes and apparent contradictions. As a bold attempt to cut the Gordian knots of metaphysical speculation in which the Mahayana philosophers had entangled themselves Zen becomes intelligible to the practical Western

mind, and indeed, sympathetic. There is something decidedly attractive in an asceticism so utterly devoid of puritanism, so full of aesthetic appreciation of nature and art, and so direct in its acceptance of life as "real," if not "earnest." Detachment without callousness, love of nature without sentimentality, and freedom without loss of self-discipline—these are presented as the fruits of the Zen way of life. M. B.

Selections from the Nippon Seishin Library. Ed. by HAYA AKEGARASU. Kaga, Japan: Kososha, 1936. Pp. 144.

This booklet is interesting as a synopsis of the faith of a Buddhist teacher who probably has the largest personal following in Japan. Besides an autobiographical introduction, it contains a translation of Shinran's "Tannisho, or Tract on Deploring the Heterodoxies"; Rev. Kiyozawa's "My Faith"; followed by the editor's "Men Above Gods," "The Present Mental Tendency and the Belief of Shinran Shonin," and "The Yamato-domashii or The Soul of Great Harmony of Japan," which epitomize the religious pilgrimage of the author. It is also indicative to a certain extent of the swing of Japanese thought in general after the Restoration. The first two articles refer to the author's religious heritage from the past; the next two are records of the *Wanderjahre* to an Occidental way of thinking and reflection; and the last denotes the return to his own, to justify it, though on a broader basis.

What makes this little booklet particularly attractive to the writer is his intimate acquaintance with the editor. Born a Shinranist at a Hongwanji temple in the conservative North, Akegarasu was an insurgent even in his undergraduate years. Highly gifted in poetic imagination, he took great delight in his youthful days in extolling Shinran's gospel of salvation through emotional sublimation, but ever alert, sensitive, and susceptible, he could not and did not remain aloof to the rising tide of western culture in Japan. His private library, which contains 20,000 books on religion, half of them being in European languages, bears testimony to his interest in Western thought. He also made a trip to India and Europe in 1926, and to this country in 1929. There were times when he wrote like a liberal, but he remains, however, a consummate conservative, a conservative who, as Lafcadio Hearn describes it in *Kokoro*, at the end of the world pilgrimage "saw the Old." In the case of Akegarasu what he saw as a symbol of the Old was not Mt. Fuji but Prince Shotoku. From Shinran he wandered throughout the world to Shotoku, Prince Regent to Empress Suiko in the early seventeenth century, who is fondly called by his countrymen "The Father of Japanese Culture." Not unlike most of his fellow-countrymen, and indeed most persons anywhere, Akegarasu was an insurgent at twenty, a liberal at thirty, but a confirmed conservative at fifty, and thereafter. R. T.

Mutter und Kind im Altbiblischen Schrifttum. By ALEXANDER MARGOULIS. Berlin: Berthold Levy, 1936. Pp. 46.

The purpose of the book, as stated by its author, is to present a picture of the relation of mother and child as depicted in the Biblical stories. He begins with the statement: "Bible history is family history," and proceeds to develop the thesis that the original patriarchal trinity of father, mother and child is the foundation of Judaism. The first commandment is "Be fruitful and multiply," and the name "Mother" the most honored title in Israel. The primary function of fatherhood is the protection of wife and offspring. Even God himself is represented as a parent, cherishing and protecting his children. The relationship of the creator to his creatures is a family relationship. In the stories of The Talmud mother-love and filial piety are frequent, and representative of the family ideal which is the chief strength of Judaism. M. B.

Histoire des Dogmes. By JOSEPH TURMEL. Vol. V. Paris: Rieder, 1936. Pp. 579. 60 fr.

The appearance of Volumes IV and V of Turmel's *History of Dogma* gives an occasion for calling attention to this monumental work in general. The arrangement of materials is neither chronological nor strictly systematic. Volume I is devoted to the history of the doctrines of original sin and redemption; Volume II, to the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Virgin; Volume III, to the Papacy; Volume IV, to the Creation, Angels, afterlife, the canon and inspiration of the Scriptures, and sanctifying grace; Volume V, to grace and the sacraments. The last volume is useful primarily for its long analysis of how sacramental theory developed after Tertullian, who sometimes spoke of the whole liturgy (baptism and eucharist) as a single sacrament, to the definite fixing of the number and functions of the sacraments; and of how the doctrine that "Christ assists at the memorial of his passion," originating in the ninth century as a reconciliation of opposing themes, later became a dogma of the Church.

This *History of Dogma* is a product of the Paris infidels, and revels in exposing the inconsistencies and other predicaments into which the Church has fallen from time to time. It is written with wit, sarcasm and irony. Nevertheless it deserves to be considered a serious contribution to church history; for even when its interpretations are most facetious its documentation and critical erudition are noteworthy. H. W. S.

Mrs. Eddy Purloins from Hegel: Newly discovered source reveals amazing plagiarisms in "Science and Health." By WALTER M. HAUSHALTER. Boston: A. A. Beauchamp, 1936. Pp. viii + 126. $1.50.

This little book publishes for the first time an essay written in 1865 by Francis Lieber, entitled "The Metaphysical Religion of Hegel." The

copy here reproduced was made by Lieber and sent, with a letter dated April 1, 1866, to Dr. Hiram F. Crafts to be read at the Kantian Society, of which Crafts was Secretary. Lieber had been introduced into intellectual circles in Boston by his friend, Charles Follen, Professor of German at Harvard, and apparently had already sent two papers previously to Dr. Crafts for the Kantian Society, entitled "Christ Power" and "Truth Power."

It happened that at this time the future Mrs. Eddy was living in the Crafts' home, and writing *Science and Health*. On the cover of the Lieber manuscript is the inscription: "N.B. This is Metaphysical Basis of Healing and Science of Health. Same as 'Christ-power' and 'Truth Power'—Mary Baker." The Rev. Mr. Haushalter has made a careful comparison of the first edition of *Science and Health* with this manuscript, and found abundant evidence, not only of the influence of this document on Mrs. Eddy's ideas, but also of numerous passages taken almost verbatim. There is an added bit of circumstantial evidence in Lieber's letter to Crafts where he pleads with the Kantian Society to "shun spiritualism; it is full of deadly evils. Cultivate the German Philosophy—Kant and Hegel."

It appears, in other words, that this is but one incident in the general rivalry between spiritualism and idealism in New England among those who were seeking a scientific faith, and that Mrs. Eddy and many of her contemporaries took over from idealism what was congenial to their religious interests without suspecting the more radical implications of Hegelian metaphysics and theology.

Quite apart, however, from its interest for the history of Christian Science, Lieber's essay is worth publishing as an exposition of Hegelian theology, and students of the history of idealism and religion in America are indebted to the publisher for making available this rare document.

H. W. S.

God Is My Adventure. By Rom Landau. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1936. Pp. xii + 407. $3.50.

In this remarkable book the author, a well known sculptor and writer, gives us the benefit of his fifteen year adventure in search of God in the personalities and teachings of the various "messiahs" of our times. His reactions to them are clear-cut, intensely personal, and definitely critical. His best work is found in the chapters on Count Keyserling, Rudolf Steiner, and Krishnamurti. These three personalities he describes with great vividness and sympathetic, though not uncritical, understanding. It is interesting that three men as completely different as these should have impressed the author as essentially alike in the qualities of honesty, courage, and faith, which he lays down as the prime components of the spiritual life. The chapters on Stefan George and P. D. Ouspensky are less satisfactory, due to the peculiarly esoteric nature of their message. His treatment of the

simple, emotional, revivalism of Principal Jeffreys is far more sympathetic than one would expect from so intellectual an observer. The three self-appointed saviours for whom Mr. Landau seems to have no respect whatever are Shri Meher Baba, the silent Parsee; Frank Buchman, "whose god is a millionaire," and the mysterious and sinister Gurdjieff, the sage of Fontainebleau. *They* are granted very short shrift indeed! The author's conclusion is that "all genuine teachers are trying to find the same truth. Differences are caused only by the differences in their states of consciousness, in their origins, or in their methods." And this truth is that "the road to truth and thus to God is shortest when we search for Him within ourselves." M. B.

L'Anima Reliosa della Guerra. By CESARE CARAVAGLIOS. Milan: A. Mondadori, 1935. Pp. 275. L. 20.

This is a valuable source book for students of religious practices of men in the face of death. From the records of Italian soldiers during the World War, Dr. Caravaglios, who is a noted contributor to the literature of folk-psychology and folk-lore, has gathered illustrations of these practices and arranged them under six heads: meditations on death, religious crises among soldiers, religious rites at the front, amulets and souvenirs, votive offerings, religion as expressed in soldiers' letters. In addition to the texts and the comments of the author there are numerous photographs. The author calls especial attention to the continuity between contemporary practices in Italy and those of the ancient Romans and Greeks.

H. W. S.

Le Règne du Frère. By FR. COBERTHRAMBE. Paris: Alcan, 1935. Pp. 159. 12 fr.

Recalling the theory of Dom Gréa in his *L'Église et sa divine constitution* (1885), and the Joachimite doctrine of the Three Reigns (successively of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit), Abbé Coberthrambe has here outlined an ingenious philosophy of history. There are three great epochs: (1) the Reign of the Father, patriarchal government, ancestor worship and devotion to the "fatherland," accompanied by philosophical monism; (2) the Reign of the Son, that is, of the first-born, hereditary government by the strong over the weak, inherited wealth, accompanied by philosophical dualism; (3) the Reign of the Brother (Christ-as-brother), fraternal organization and international equality, accompanied by "trinism" (the recognition of three orders—the material, the intellectual and the moral). This thesis is worked out with a critical insight into history and trinitarian theology, and with considerable erudition to which we cannot do justice in this brief note. His analysis of the decline of the Reign of the Son, and the present signs of the dawning of the Reign of the Brother is certainly worth serious reading. H. W. S.

Knowing the Bible. By RAYMOND C. KNOX. Revised edition. New York Macmillan, 1936. Pp. 281. $2.50.

A standard text-book by the Chaplain of Columbia University revised to include much important new information based on recent archaeological discoveries, containing a carefully selected bibliography, as well as reference works at the end of each chapter. A very useful book for Bible students, written in the form of a syllabus.

Civilisation et Synthèse. By A.-H. FOROUGHI. Paris: Alcan, 1936. Pp. vii + 87. Fr. 10.

In addition to several articles on cultural synthesis this volume contains an article on Bergsonian philosophy as a meeting point of East and West, and one on Firdousi and the synthetic philosophy of Iran.

Der Mythus: Rosenbergbetrachtungen. By ALBRECHT OEPKE. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1935. Pp. 64. RM 1.13.

An exposition of Rosenberg's misuse of science and history in his *The Myth of the Twentieth Century*, and a defense of the concept of "gospel" as opposed to the concept of "myth."

Death and Elizabethan Tragedy. By THEODORE SPENCER. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936. Pp. xii + 288. $2.50.

The Fifth Gospel. By HAROLD METCALF. Muscatine, Iowa: The Prairie Press, 1936. Pp. 80.

AMONG THE PERIODICALS

The Supreme Spiritual Ideal: The Hindu View. By SIR S. RADHAKRISHNAN. *Hibbert Journal.* Vol. XXXV, No. 1.

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Das Glaubensbekenntnis im Kirchenlied. By CHRISTA MÜLLER. *Monatschrift für Gottesdienst und kirchliche Kunst.* Vol. 41, No. 7.

Liturgy in the Age of Gothic. By PAUL BUSSARD. *Orate Fratres.* Vol. X. Nos. 11-12.

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The Miracle of Lourdes. By SYLVIA LEITH-ROSS. *Hibbert Journal.* Vol. XXXV, No. 1.

L'Immaculée Conception dans la théologie de l'Angleterre médiévale. By A. W. Burridge. *Revue d'Histoire Ecclesiastique.* Vol. XXXII, No. 3.

La plus ancienne legende de Saint Georges. By FRANZ CUMONT. *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions.* Vol. CXIV, No. 1.

Der Erloser als Gestalt. By DOZENT LIC. DR. SCHULTZ. *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche.* Vol. 17, No. 3.

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